Rebellion in Mississippi *The Editors*

THE NEW REPUBLIC

Talks on the "Red Riviera"

Philip Ben

Prospects for November

Angus Campbell

The No-Cities Doctrine

Morton Halperin

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Mississippi and Moscow

★ Mississippi racists said the university could not be integrated without bloodshed so it is with a sense of justification that they produced bloodshed. They needed a death or two to save face. Many prayerfully hoped, who listened to Kennedy's solemn, restrained, magnanimous appeal, that violence could be averted. It was not to be, the mob took over instigated in part by outsiders. How long should revolvers, rifles and machine guns be indiscriminately sold around the US without a federal license? There can be only one end to this story though it may take long in coming. Through it all we think of James Meredith, Negro war veteran, facing contumely, ostracism and possible martyrdom for a cause in which our national honor is involved. Strength to him! Once upon a time there was gallantry and generosity in the brave young ranks of Dixie. Is any of it left?

Whatever happens in Mississippi the world jogs on. In talks with conservatives lately, we have found them exultantly down-grading Russia's industrial threat. Why? Well, Russia recently had to raise the price of butter and now it has postponed a promised tax cut. Russia is "in bad trouble industrially," conservative friends tell us, with a complacency almost complete.

It is a funny thing. Any ardent liberal invariably gets called "pink" or even "pro-Communist" because he supports civil liberties and other dangerous parts of the Constitution. And yet it has always seemed to TRB that liberals are more realistically anti-Communist than most of the right-wingers. Take Russia, for example. The Soviets from the beginning have placed guns before butter. They have imposed an iron discipline and pushed capital investment with a resultant speed of industrial growth that is frightening. It frightens *us* anyway, but then we are a liberal; conservatives can't be frightened because it would mean an examination of America's laggard economy and an acknowledgement that something is terribly wrong.

Pravda last week splashed out a Lenin document insisting that the Cold War will be won or lost on the industrial front. Exactly. And when Moscow ups the price of butter and rejects a tax cut it means that it is grimly following this policy. (The time to relax will be when Moscow gives its masses more consumer goods.)

A year or so ago *Reader's Digest* told multi-million readers that they couldn't trust government unemployment figures; that high unemployment was just a fake. Since the *Digest* is about the only big magazine outside the Iron Curtain that won't publish letters of correction, the government set up an unimpeachable review group. Its report, now published, shows that the 5.6 percent US unemployment is, outside of Canada, the highest of all industrial countries in the free world. It has been the highest for months and recently got higher; it is now 5.8 percent.

Economic Outlook

★ *The New York Times* fiscal review of the third quarter calls the economy "mixed" and the outlook "cloudy." A "moderate downturn in 1963," says banker David Eastburn of the Philadelphia Reserve system. Maybe yes; maybe no. Who cares about the new jitters on the *stock market*? The point is that the richest country on earth, challenged for the first time in its life, can't be bothered to put its industrial front in order.

Thank heaven for Leon Keyserling. We don't always agree with him 100 percent (we don't even agree with TRB 100 percent). But steadily and doggedly he gets out a series of documented pamphlets showing what a chronically stagnant economy costs Americans. His latest is "Key Policies for Full Employment" (50c; Conference on Economic Progress, 1001 Connecticut Ave., Washington). Our annual economic growth, he points out, has averaged only 2.7 percent for 10 years. It could have been twice that.

Same Old Congress

★ The election is one month away. At this point we see no major trend; one may develop, but as of now we go along with Angus Campbell who says in this issue of *The New Republic* that the new Congress will be much like the old. Mid-term elections tend to be vastly over-interpreted. Normally the opposition party (the one that lost the previous Presidential election) gains House seats. We have averaged the gain for the last six off-year elections. It is 46. Will the GOP win 46 or more seats in 1962? It would amaze us – our guess would be far less, if any.

We should say Kennedy's chief prestige risk lies not in the House but in the governorship races in five or six key states. A series of Administration losses in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, California, plus Rocky's expected victory in New York, would be damaging.

As Congress quits it moves too fast for the eye to follow. It shakes its fist at Cuba, cuts foreign aid, writes hasty foreign policy on the floor and meanwhile listens to sleek lobbyists behind the scenes. This is the time when desperate compromises are made, when almost any representative has veto power, when the voter is incapable of knowing what is happening. Legislation passed in the last week of Congress is nearly always bad legislation.

Notes

★ A number of happy developments brighten the news: Georgia reapportionment knocked off arch-segregationist Rep. James Davis – a small-town bully of Washington school officials, elected by a vicious rotten borough. . . . Congress said "go" to the Hanford (Washington) power authority: By-product steam from the plutonium plant – instead of discomforting fish in the Columbia River – will run an 800,000 kw generating station, largest nuclear power plant in the world. . . . And after eight years the UAW finally wins complete victory in the bitter Kohler Company (Wis.) strike with back pay to several thousand workers.

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Rebellion in Mississippi

Governor Ross Barnett, that latter-day Daniel Shays, has retreated, to do battle again peaceably in the very courts against which he had rebelled. No one can know what that may mean, but in direct consequence of his defiance of the law, a mob on Sunday night shot one man in the back, another through the head, wounded scores more and left the Mississippi campus in shambles. Though at the very last moment, the Governor foreswore violence, it was from him that the mob derived its insane inspiration, and he is unrepentant. The tragedy may at least give pause in the future to grown men in responsible positions before they abandon themselves to secessionist hysteria.

The Administration had no recourse, and its reaction in the end was sure and balanced, even as it had been in face of the Montgomery freedom-ride riot a year and a half ago. There was no resort other than force. The argument – to which Arthur Krock of the *New York Times* has been lending the thinnest possible veneer of respectability – that an appeal to the Supreme Court should have been awaited is disingenuous nonsense. The only appeal possible had been had and lost. That was for a stay of the orders of the lower court. It is indisputably the law – as John L. Lewis learned greatly to his cost well over 10 years ago – that unless such a stay is granted, such orders are enforceable and are enforced. Stays were denied because the underlying substantive law is itself settled beyond doubt; it was tolerably well settled with respect to the universities some years before it was laid down with ultimate clarity, in 1954, for all schools.

Nor were other forms of pressure on the Mississippi authorities possible, such as the withdrawal of, or threats to withdraw, various forms of federal assistance from which Mississippi benefits as much as any other state, if not more. Leave to depart from the Union is not an admissible federal reply to secessionist insurrection. It was not Jackson's message to South Carolina or Lincoln's to the Confederacy. Moreover, Governor Barnett and his supporters are not the only Mississippians who are citizens of an indivisible nation. The Negroes and white moderates who together may well form a majority of the state's population also live under the protection and authority of the laws and constitution of the United States.

Having said that the Administration's final action faced up surely and firmly to the inevitable; having added that the President's speech on Sunday, September 30 was admirable; and having said also, as this journal has more than once remarked, that the Kennedy Admin-

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istration's actions with respect to civil rights have been generally vigorous, creative and principled, it must nevertheless be noted that for some crucial days prior to that bloody Sunday the Administration delayed. And it is worth speculating whether that delay was prudent. This is important, for similar crises are likely to recur, in Alabama and South Carolina as well as in Mississippi. Who can be certain that James Meredith, who has now been registered, will proceed peaceably to graduation? The chances are rather against it, and would have been in any event. The objective is to assure that the next Meredith is more readily admitted, so that the one after, or the one after that, may receive a normal university education. The process demands heroic men and women, but the Negro community seems miraculously able to produce them. (Asked if he were happy that his struggle to enroll was successful, Meredith said simply: "No, this is not a happy occasion.") To the end that Negro students have equal access to public education, enforcement crises must be resolved decisively and promptly so that the futility of resistance is never in the slightest doubt.

Governor Barnett had given an utterly clear notice of his intentions to thwart the orders of the US court. At first, it was hard to imagine he meant it. Fifty-nine years have passed since the Negro-baiting James Vardaman was elected Governor of Mississippi – the man who had said: "This education is ruining our Negroes. They're demanding equality." It has surely been plain ever since Little Rock that the country expects the President to enforce integration decrees without fashioning compromises of his own, and that the Supreme Court will not compromise beyond the measure of accommodation that is implicit in the "deliberate speed" formula itself. That formula, in turn, is applicable only to primary and secondary schools, not to universities. Thus, while there was room for doubt about the outcome when Governor Faubus embarked on his course of defiance at Little Rock, there was not when Governor Barnett took his last stand against the admission of Meredith nearly two weeks ago. The only real question was whether the Governor would close the university. He had the sympathy of a majority of his white constituents, no doubt, but he stood relatively alone as twice – on September 20 and 25 – he barred the way to Mr. Meredith.

On Wednesday, September 26, the third attempt to register one Negro student was made. It failed. The federal force that presented itself at the gates of Ole Miss with Meredith consisted of one Justice Department lawyer and one Federal Marshal. It was repulsed, after a bit of unarmed shoving, by the Lieutenant Governor assisted by 20 state policemen. Some 15 sheriffs from surrounding counties controlled the crowd. No one will ever know, but it is worth asking if 200 US Marshals and other officers could not on that day, more or less politely, have shoved their way past the Lieutenant Governor and his force.

No one will know, because the Administration was determined to use every sort of non-violent coercion it could. It thereby ran the risk of misleading those who pass from debate to insurrection that they would be negotiated with. It hoped to convince Barnett to back down – and he finally did, but only when confronted with the very force the Administration was so anxious to avoid. It waited until Sunday, when fewer students are on the campus. Not until then did the President speak. But by then the state had dug itself in psychologically. Mobs had had time to form, to feel protected, to be agitated and perhaps organized. By then, that demented defender of our "freedoms," former Gen. Edwin A. Walker, had arrived to lead a charge of a thousand students against their government and to yell: "Let's not quit; we can win." The battle was thus joined, but joined later and perhaps with more violent consequences than might have been.

And in Alabama . . .

On September 22, one of the largest crowds ever gathered at a public event in Alabama watched the University of Alabama football team romp over Georgia, 35-0. Among the 54,000 spectators were Jimmy Warren and Wilson Brown, the first Negroes to sit in the stands during a Southeastern Conference football game in the state. As they took their seats, a man on their right got up and moved. The one on their left did not. Throughout the game field glasses were trained away from the field and on the two fans in the end zone, but no one got up and left.

One man was heard to say: "If we leave them alone, no one will know the difference."

Of course the airport, the bus and train stations in Birmingham have been integrated for some time. Warren and Brown were sold tickets following a federal court decree ordering the desegregation of all recreation facilities in Birmingham. City parks were thereupon closed by the authorities, but the Zoo, Vulcan Park and Legion Field remained open. The city had to sell tickets to football games to anyone with $5 to pay for them.

At the end of the third quarter, with Alabama a clear winner, the two Negroes started to leave. Soon after, about a hundred people began running out the front gate. Outside, there was a scuffle; some blows were struck before police pulled the crowd back, but neither Brown nor Wilson was badly hurt. The story rated a few paragraphs on the back pages of the local papers, but UPI carried it, and by now it is widely known that Negroes can buy tickets to Alabama games.

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Dick and Jane Are Good

A recent study of primary school readers by psychologist Otto Klineberg confirms many a parent's suspicion that the world of "Dick and Jane" is make-believe. Klineberg found, for example, that not one of the readers he examined ever referred to people who haven't enough money – except, of course, foreigners. Nor did any mention the existence of Negroes, much less suggesting that they have special problems in America. Sectarian religion was also ignored (although in one reader "Mr. Carl" attends church on Sunday). Psychologically as well as socially these readers have a pollyanna quality. Their protagonists are all happy and well adjusted, without physical or mental disabilities. They are occasionally angry, but never for long.

Many educators and textbook publishers recognize the unworldliness of the world they describe to children. But, they point out, the real world is one of controversy and violence. If you portray it truthfully, you import all its conflicts into the classroom. Parents won't stand for it.

Take high school social studies textbooks. The section on courtship and marriage always describes an idealized relationship, and it usually describes ideals of 50 years ago. Nobody is divorced in a social studies textbook (Catholic school board members and parents would object.) The fact that one marriage in four ends in divorce, and that something like one child in six comes from a broken home, is simply not a fact of life – unless, of course, the child reads novels, or goes to the movies or has friends.

The myths cultivated by American history books could also be catalogued. To take a single illustration, our foreign policy is always treated as an effort to promote the happiness and well-being of people overseas. The concept of "national self-interest" – the influence of "business diplomacy" and "airbase diplomacy" – is not discussed in any of the widely-used textbooks. Only foreigners are self-seeking. The analogies between American expansion into what used to be Mexico and Soviet expansion into what used to be Poland, Rumania and the Baltic states are by-passed. The mixture of colonialism and genocide which underlay 19th Century policy toward the American Indians is similarly neglected.

Direct popular control of public schools makes it easy for every small pressure group to veto this or that section of a textbook. The cumulative result of all these vetoes is a school curriculum that is pollyanna in quality, giving a view of the world so alien to truth that children turn eagerly even to the pseudo-realism of movies and television.

But even with popular control, good textbooks may not be impossible. Some foundation with a yen for

Footnotes *to the* Week

SINO-SOVIET TENSION has been exacerbated after several months of quiescence by the mission of Leonid Brezhnev to Yugoslavia. The presence of the Soviet President in Belgrade last week was treated as a calculated insult in Chinese Communist Party organs. From a Soviet standpoint the mission appears to have misfired on all sides, for the Brezhnev attacks on American "militarism" and West German "fascism" were embarrassing to the Yugoslavs and cooled their hospitality perceptibly. Marshal Tito reportedly feels that Belgrade has moved as close as it can afford to move toward Moscow on foreign policy issues, but wants increased trade with the Soviet Union and the East European satellites as a response to the Common Market. —— SOVIET BLOC *oil exports to Common Market countries will be a principal issue at the meeting this week of the Council of Ministers of the Six in Luxembourg. Limitations on Soviet crude oil would have particular impact in Italy, which now consumes more than half of the Soviet oil sold within the Market. Most other members favor a quota limiting Soviet crude oil exports to 10 percent of the total for the Six. Soviet shipments have risen from 184,000 barrels a day in 1960 (8 percent) to 237,000 (9 percent) last year.* —— ILLITERACY AND UNEMPLOYMENT are found side by side in a survey of the Chicago unemployed. Although most of those surveyed have completed the five years in school which census takers traditionally regard as prima facie evidence of literacy, only 49 percent can actually read and write simple sentences. The city is launching a small-scale venture to send illiterates back to school, and if the scheme works it may be expanded to all those now on relief rolls. —— AIR ACCESS *to Central Africa is expected to be a key objective of the Soviet Union in dealings with Yemen following the death of the 71-year-old Imam and the assassination of Crown Prince Mohammed Al-Bada. The governments of both Yemen and the Sudan have refused to grant transit facilities to Soviet (or Egyptian) aircraft en route to the Congo. Although Sudan's policy remains unaltered, there are fears in some Administration quarters that the new regime which emerges out of the present confusion in the Yemeni capital of Sana will be ready to horse-trade for Soviet airstrips.* —— EXTRA PROFITS are being used as a lure by Pentagon procurement managers. A new "incentive contract" is replacing cost-plus-fixed-fee for most weapons-system development projects. It specifies cost and performance goals which, if met on schedule, bring an extra profit; if not, profits are correspondingly reduced. In one typical "incentive" contract, a large electronics firm stands to make an extra $1 million above its guaranteed profit on a $15 million job.

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heroic service might try sponsoring some more accurate (and hence controversial) textbooks – perhaps written by people from outside the schools who don't take all the taboos for granted. Their sales might not be as bad as the commercial publishers prophesy.

Two-Headed Farm Bill

Most working farmers don't remember what it was like when a free market drove them into bankruptcy a quarter of a century ago. Since the first price-support legislation was passed in the late 30's, producers of basic crops have been able to sell their harvests at prices at or above levels fixed by law. For two and a half decades, the government has tried to restrict production by limiting the acreage that growers eligible for protection under these programs are permitted to plant. As a result, the farmer's traditional propensity to produce as much as possible on the ground he does use has been more than encouraged; it actually has been subsidized through a policy of shielding him from the penalties a free market imposes upon those who overload it. And the farmer, in turn, has fought off efforts to shrink his acreage. In that battle, he has had the help of Congress and of spectacular advances in agricultural technology.

The few acres that Congress has taken away from the price-protected farmer from time to time have been more than matched by the application of increased tonnages of high-grade fertilizers, mixed to fit the particular soil and the crop that grows on it; and improved tillage methods made practical, even in conditions of a dwindling farm labor supply, by expensive new machinery. Commercial farmers have applied still more tonnages of sophisticated insecticides to blight every bug that dares to crawl through their heavily capitalized fields – and of course herbicides too, chemicals that smother all unwanted growth.

Year after year the Congress has made passes at the problem of mounting, subsidized surpluses – and then backed off. This year, under pressure from the Secretary of Agriculture to face the problem squarely, Congress approved not one but two farm bills – each different. First the House rejected the Administration's call for strict controls; then the Senate, under the prodding of Mr. Ellender of Louisiana, modified the Administration's formula and passed it. The House subsequently took up the question again and voted for an altogether different sort of bill, extending the present "emergency" legislation under which farmers who grow food and feed grains (wheat and corn, chiefly) are paid by the Department of Agriculture to reduce acreages sown to these crops and receive a guaranteed price for the bushels harvested from these smaller plantings. Faced with the problem of assembling in a hurry one piece of legislation, the House-Senate conference committee stitched the two bills together. But it also could not resist a bit of embroidery of its own.

The embroidery provides that farmers who reduce their acreage shall be given a bonus of 18 cents a bushel on the grains they grow on the reduced acreage, *after* receiving payment at the current rate for making the reduction. This frill evoked most vitriolic comment in the ensuing debate on the conference report in both Houses of Congress. Nevertheless, this two-headed compromise was approved, apparently because it contains a number of other features which may help the Secretary of Agriculture put a damper on the surplus-breeding fertility of US agriculture.

One such feature is a land-use clause which may be the beginning of a program for diverting some excessive farmland now under cultivation to recreational and other nonfarm uses. The other is a provision in the second half of the bill, operative in the crop year of 1964, that wheat shall be subject to control by quantity or bushelage, rather than acreage. (Wheat yields have doubled in the past 20 years.)

In brief, the 87th Congress decided to pay a farmer for one year at the going rate for using less land, and to offer him a bonus for producing still more on the land that remains to him.

The farmers in the long run have only two alternatives: Either guaranteed prices, for which they must accept strict production controls and the disappearance of many a marginal farm; or, a return to the free market – no controls, nothing but the devil take the hindmost. Perhaps only another taste of the latter can convince the protected farmers that the facts of life in the technological 60's are what they are.

California's Fourth "R"

Not much is heard outside California about the nonpartisan race for State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Ordinarily, the contest would be of interest only to educators, but this year one of the two candidates on the November ballot is Maxwell Rafferty, the first Birch-bark politician with a chance to win a statewide office. Rafferty is quite a character. To him, the Russians are a "race of lash-driven atheistic peasants." Our educational leaders are "antique, thin-lipped spinsters . . . who sat at the feet of John Dewey."

In a speech before the LaCanada School Board in 1961, Rafferty said among other things that a "staggering number of our young men just 10 years ago sold out their fellow American soldiers and licked the boots of the brutal Chinese and North Korean invaders." He went on to characterize part of our youth as "spineless,

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luxury-loving, spiritless creeps"; others are "growing up to become booted, sideburned, ducktailed, unwashed, leather-jacketed slobs, whose favorite sport is ravaging little girls and stomping polio victims to death." Eventually, it was all reprinted in the *Reader's Digest*. Recently, Dr. Rafferty published a book, *Suffer Little Children*, in which it is suggested that gifted children be removed from their homes and placed in selected foster homes. As for delinquents who are a "disease," his educational prescription is an "alert police and tough courts."

Rafferty's opponent is Ralph Richardson, a professor at UCLA, a member of the Los Angeles City Board of Education and the president of that Board until several weeks ago. Richardson has a fine record of leadership of the second largest school system in the nation, and he will probably win since he is backed by every responsible educator in the state. But Rafferty's campaign is well-heeled, not only because he is the Radical Right's only statewide candidate, but because the state Superintendent has a good deal to say about textbook selection and the school curriculum.

Marking Time in Peru

While the journalistic eye has been focused on a narrowly-averted civil war in Argentina and the continuing Soviet buildup in Cuba, a tense situation in Peru has subsided into welcome, but perhaps deceptive, calm. The military junta headed by General Perez Godoy, partly as a result of US pressures, has so far governed with restraint reminiscent of the mild dictatorship of Manual Odría (1948-1956). The press has been allowed to operate with reasonable freedom, there are only a handful of political prisoners (including Communist Party General Secretary Acosta Salas), and the junta promises to turn power over to a civilian regime after elections next June. Since the general strike directed by the Social Democrats was broken (with the Communists helping to break it), the generals have been able to rule without harsh repressive measures; the banks are open, the *sol* is stable, and business is going on much as usual.

In temporarily breaking relations with the military regime (Ambassador James Loeb has not returned to Lima, nor been replaced) the US evidently overestimated Peruvian willingness to rise against it. For one thing, the Peruvian Army is armed to the teeth, largely with US weapons; Colonel Gonzalo Briceno, a graduate of the US Ranger School at Fort Benning, Georgia, used a Sherman tank to break down the gates of the Presidential palace. For another, the gestures toward reform of the deposed Prado regime were nothing to inspire popular support. Maximum holdings under Prado's Agrarian Reform Law were set at 1,250 acres, a limit which a careful student (Professor Richard W. Patch) calls "far too generous to conform to the realities of population pressure." Furthermore, the law would not apply to any estates formed before 1962 – a stipulation that gave the plan a touch of the absurd. The Prado regime's housing program was equally spurious; 800 "low-cost" houses to be built by Nelson Rockefeller's IBE Corporation were to sell for several times the lifetime earnings of the average Peruvian, and to contain "exterior and interior gardens, servants' patios and service entrances, combination living and dining rooms, bedrooms, baths and kitchens."

The present calm will probably not last very long. Half-starved groups of *comuneros* (communal landholders) have been arming themselves with pickaxes, shovels and shotguns, and attempting to seize plantations in the *sierra*. Last month *fidelista* students won control of the Student Federation; dozens of them have made clandestine trips to Havana (via Mexico) for instruction in Marxism, organizational tactics, and guerrilla warfare. Several potential Castros have emerged: José Carlos de la Puente, a former student leader who has led raids on plantations, and Hugo Blanco, a Quechau-speaking intellectual who is organizing the farm laborers and peasants in Chaupumayo.

The statistics are drearily familiar: 800,000 school-age children without schools, one estate 10 times as large as Rhode Island, a life expectancy of 35 years, per capita income of $120 (but ranging from $30 to $400,000), an average annual consumption of over five pounds of hunger-deadening coca leaves in the mountain regions. The *Alianza* has so far not begun to scratch the surface of these problems. Professor Patch, recently returned from several years' residence and study, warns that "it is only a matter of time before someone appears – visionary or demagogue, it will not make a great deal of difference – who will organize the power of five million Indians for his own ends. Then, not all the rifles of the civil guard, the tanks of the army, or the jets of the air force, will be able to resist a reform which will be more akin to revolution."

COMING: *19 economists discuss the economy, why it's ailing and what can be done*

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THE COMMON MARKET BATTLE LINES ARE DRAWN

Gaitskell Comes Off the Fence

London

Since Mr. Macmillan told the Commonwealth prime ministers that he now saw no alternative but to join Europe ("and, after all, we are independent too") the ordered British party structure and its habitual class voting are visibly starting to splinter: in the end it could be the 1840's and the repeal of the corn laws all over again. On October 13 Macmillan will face the Conservative Party's annual conference at Llandudno, in north Wales, to discover whether he is carrying with him the deferential heart of the party, not the baronets and brigadiers but the town councilors and their wives, the representatives of the provincial, commercial, middle-class England that grew up when the map was still red with Empire. If he succeeds, the danger of a serious right-wing Tory revolt in the Commons, centering on some 30-40 MPs who have declared themselves (with varying degrees of conviction) against entry, should steadily ebb away.

Macmillan has been forced into declaring himself by the rising anti-market agitation, egged on by the Beaverbrook newspapers, that followed the temporary breakdown of the Brussels negotiation in August. Public opinion polls have been veering, until very lately, away from membership. Some cabinet members who sensed the discontent seeping into the Tory constituency parties wished to press the button right away for a Central Office publicity campaign. But Ted Heath, who is doing the actual negotiation with the Six, believed that too positive a commitment at home would throw away his only bargaining powers for Commonwealth trade at Brussels. Now the uncooperative attitude of the white dominion premiers, particularly Diefenbaker and New Zealand's Holyoake, seems to have nettled Heath, so that the new tack is likely to be to try to persuade de Gaulle's partners that Britain does mean business – and to rely on their pressure to force the French hand.

But it has been Hugh Gaitskell who has really converted Macmillan into a determined European. On the eve of the Commonwealth premiers' meeting on September 10 Gaitskell fell heavily from the fence he had ridden for the past year – onto the anti-European side. His object appears to have been entirely tactical: to capitalize on internal Tory discontent in order to force a general election while the government's stock in the country is at rock bottom. Paradoxically enough, this was the opening Macmillan was waiting for. First, it meant that he could confront the Tory rebels with the agonizing dilemma that to die in the last ditch for the Commonwealth was to play straight into Labour's hands: to lifelong anti-socialists who have never forgiven Gaitskell for his personal attitude at Suez-time this is an appalling thought. Second, it meant that Labour's 50-60 declared pro-marketeers (one of the discreeter ones being George Brown, the deputy leader) would now be put on their mettle to oppose Gaitskell's uncompromising stand or be discredited themselves – and the most promising part of the new Labour image with them. The resurgent, pro-European Liberals, at their annual jamboree last month, made no secret of their intention to draw Labour's younger, pro-market members into their ranks.

For the opinion polls now show the British to be a nation of voters in search of new parties. There is a manifest majority for joining Europe among those between 21 and 45 in age, those in white-collar jobs and those earning a middle-class income (which includes an appreciable number of what used to be called the skilled working class, earning over £25 a week). Those against are heavily weighted with the over-45's and the unskilled manual laborers – and very much with those who had little chance of pursuing a full-time education beyond the age of 16. This is the best delineation yet of the two Britains of the 1960's. The true political division which the European debate has catalyzed is between those whose instinct, training and economic interest is to cling desperately to the existing system (the old high Tories and the solid Labour battalions in the declining industrial areas of the north and west where unemployment is again becoming chronic) and those who have grown up politically in the postwar world and whose self-interest lies in the growth of real earnings through economic expansion.

It is among the new middle class of the growth areas and their commuter suburbs that the Macmillan Tories and the Liberals are zealously contending for support. In the next election (which could be as late as 1964) they may conceivably cut each other's throats. But in the long run the chief loser is likely to be Labour, steadily driven into protectionism and the permanent subsidization of the flagging Victorian industries (uneconomic mines and railways, Lancashire cotton, shipbuilding). That way, however well it may continue to poll in its beleaguered and bedrock socialist strongholds, Labour cannot expect to get back into real power.

ALASTAIR BURNET

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Complete Breakdown in Cuba?

It is easy to misconstrue the pessimistic reports on the condition of Cuban agriculture. Food and raw materials production *have* fallen off; this year's margin between planned and actual output of some crops will climb to 200 per cent. The sugar harvest failed to reach 5 million tons (the target was over 7 million tons). Rice, cotton, coffee (afflicted by floods), even the *viandas* – basic to the Cuban diet – are down from last year. Beef and dairy products, and probably poultry prospects, are unpromising. And, one might add, Cubans cannot live on fish alone.

The 1962 goals were based on the harvests of 1960-61; these were the planners' bench marks. Compared with 1958, and to some extent 1959, these years favored Cuban agriculture; the future seemed to hold out more promise. The Agrarian Reform Institute's (INRA) cadres, some without farming experience, surprised everyone by engineering a vast agrarian reform without crippling agricultural production. On the contrary, harvests of export crops, together with those for home consumption, expanded more or less steadily from 1958 to 1960, and in some instances into 1961.

Of the sources of this progress, the expansion of the internal market probably deserves first place. The government allowed money wages to rise, and at the same time the National Bank curbed food imports, channeling the new demand into the home market. Simultaneously, INRA offered low cost credits to private farmers and heavily subsidized the cooperatives and state administered farms. Moreover, within the INRA hierarchy a firm and continual emphasis was placed on production. Optimum-size producing units were therefore retained, the big sugar, cattle, and rice plantations kept intact. Despite a horde of minor blunders, it is difficult to avoid putting the first two years of agrarian reform down as a triumph.

Dizzy with success, INRA in 1961 and 1962 demanded still more from Cuba's farmers who, as it turned out, failed to comply. To some observers, the late 1961-1962 failures are symptomatic of *permanent* weaknesses in Cuba's agriculture and therefore will be magnified in the future. To be sure, it is sometimes admitted that 1962 was a year of severe drought, but the emphasis is placed elsewhere. Tad Szulc is one for whom the crisis of 1962 seems to mark the beginning of the end: ". . . The collapsing Cuban economy is an increasing and perhaps ultimately useless drain on the Soviet resources." (*N. Y. Times*, August 19.)

The sources of the crisis, according to the *Times*' Cuba expert, lay in the "utter disorganization" of the rural economy. Now it must be stressed that serious administrative shortcomings ("utter disorganization") had been lurking in the background of Cuban agriculture since 1959, only to be fully revealed in 1961 by a *sudden shift from one mode of agricultural production to another*. During the initial prosperous years Cuban farmers revived agriculture on the basis of *extensive* cultivation, the historic foundation of the island's rural economy. Bulldozers plowed up pasturage and land under the *marabu* weed; the cleared land was then cultivated with the aid of methods of production employed for decades earlier. Private farmers were therefore using techniques with which they were thoroughly familiar. In the public sector (comprising about 50 percent of Cuba's farm land by mid-1961) the old methods taxed the abilities of only the most inexperienced administrators. With abundant unused lands and a surplus of rural labor there was little to impede the rapid expansion of agricultural production.

In 1961, however, Cuba moved from *extensive* to *intensive* modes of expanding production. Until then, yields per acre had changed very little; now they were to be improved by incorporating advanced techniques into Cuban farming. INRA experts believed that there was no longer any profit in bringing new lands under the plow. Besides, a labor shortage had appeared in the sugar sector. Consequently, the island's agriculture would be streamlined, land and labor productivity raised, the largest farms mechanized. New stress was laid on the use of high quality seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides; a number of irrigation projects were begun, a few completed; small farms were advised to introduce new rotations and INRA prematurely ordered the cane cooperatives and people's farms to usher in a system of mixed agriculture. An intolerable burden fell on the administrator of each of the roughly 1000 state-run farm units. In no sense agricultural experts, new skills were suddenly, and unrealistically, demanded of them.

It is apparent now that they were simply not up to the job and, understandably, made a shambles of the new scientific agriculture. Applications of inappropriate fertilizers, applied in the wrong quantities and at the wrong time, reduced yields. Cuban farmers planted new improved seed in the same manner as they had planted the old, and watched the young shoots and stalks die. Mishandling of insecticides killed bugs and crops indiscriminately. The transport and distribution systems bogged down in red tape, failing to adjust smoothly to the transformation of both the domestic and foreign markets, exposing glaring inadequacies in the island's storage facilities. The cumulative effect of

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the failures reached into industry, Cuba's export trade, and retail food outlets. Shortages of *malanga* put pressures on the island's potato supplies; when there were no longer any potatoes, there were consumer runs on other basic root crops. The shortcomings of the farm managers set into motion a spiral of shortages, hoarding, further shortages, an embryonic black market.

The government had finally to reorganize the cane cooperatives last month when INRA technicians were given more effective control over their management. Two further developments can be anticipated: decentralization of the over-sized people's farms and new attempts to integrate private farms into the structure of the reformed rural economy. In fact, for the next year or two, the private sector will undoubtedly receive exaggerated emphasis, a policy which in the United States will probably be interpreted as another mysterious doctrinal shift. It will in fact be nothing of the sort. Purely tactical in conception, it will give the public sector some badly needed time, during which agronomists and technicians newly-trained in the Soviet Union and by INRA's untried but impressive agricultural schools will increasingly come to staff Cuba's state farms. With the planned mechanization of sugar production, labor shortages will no longer obstruct cane harvests.

Meanwhile, today's farm administrators are desperately trying to learn their jobs. Sooner or later their abilities too will cease to war with the tasks INRA has imposed on them. Cuba's agricultural crisis is therefore transitional; barring an all-out civil war the rural economy should be working smoothly in two or three years. When Mr. Szulc writes that "the United States can . . . hope, with more reason than ever before, that a complete breakdown in Cuba may be inevitable in the end," he is probably indulging in wishful thinking.

JAMES O'CONNOR

Report from the Red Riviera–I

PHILIP BEN, *a correspondent of* Le Monde *and* Maariv *of Tel Aviv at the United Nations, returns every summer to Eastern Europe to see numerous friends there. He has just returned from the "Red Riviera," a Bulgarian resort area on the Black Sea which has become an Eldorado for people of prominence in the Communist world. Mr. Ben speaks the three main languages of the Soviet bloc, and was able to converse freely. This is the first of two articles for* The New Republic *reporting on his impressions.*

Whenever, during the talks I had in August with Communist officials and prominent intellectuals vacationing on the "Red Riviera" in Bulgaria, we came to the problem of Berlin, it was not I who did most of the questioning. Hearing that I had come straight from America, they were bursting to know what Kennedy would do. Their anxiety did not surprise me. A year earlier, when the Berlin crisis was at its height, I had travelled about Russia and seen people storming the shops to buy the last cake of soap or the last sack of flour. Now, without waiting for my reply, all my interviewers without exception – Russians, Poles, Czechs, East Germans – were telling me that the Berlin problem had been exaggerated, and that in fact the Americans were already prepared for a "reasonable solution"; it was only that President Kennedy had to silence his "reactionaries," and Dr. Adenauer!

What my friends meant by a "compromise" over Berlin was the acceptance of the basic Soviet position, with some minor modifications. For example, an official of the Polish foreign office told me that Moscow would even agree to the presence of small, symbolic Western garrisons in West Berlin – though not as occupation troops. As for a date for a Soviet-inspired "peace conference," most of my informants thought one would not be set soon. A Czech diplomat pointed out that preparations had not yet begun, and that such a conference could not be arranged in a few days. Some non-committed nations have been quietly sounded out, he said, but he did not claim the response was encouraging.

These were highly-placed intellectuals and professional people – in brief, the Communist elite. They knew how to quote important Americans to support their view that "Washington is coming to its senses."

With a heavy heart, I felt I had to dissent. I told them that I did not have the impression the United States was ready to accept Soviet terms on Berlin and added that, to the best of my knowledge, that is not what President Kennedy intends to do; and that even if it were, public opinion would not stand for it.

Smiles disappeared: "Are you serious? So what will happen? A new world war?"

I always hastened to reassure my friends: "War?

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Certainly not. I think that if you conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany and try to obstruct traffic in West Berlin, the Western Powers will reply with counter-measures, but on a world scale." And, letting my fantasy run freely, I spoke of a possible Western embargo on all trade with the Communist bloc – a ban on all financial transactions, a ban on travel, a refusal to issue even transit visas to Communist nationals, bans on over-flights by Communist airlines, an end to all cultural exchanges and scholarships.

Their anger, their fright, only increased: "What do you mean, a ban on trade? We would no longer be able to sell our goods to the US, to Britain, to West Germany? No more dealings with American and French banks? No more American scholarships? No more visas to the Paris Congresses and to the Venice Festivals? No transit visas? How would we reach Cuba?" And again, without waiting for my reply, they answered themselves: "No, you are talking nonsense, there will be no Berlin crisis, no Western reprisals, everything will be settled smoothly."

One of the top bosses of the Polish economy, a man with a wide knowledge of the West European economy, the American banking system, conditions in Africa, told me that he could never believe the United States would seriously consider economic sanctions because of any crisis over Berlin. "Last year," he said, "when the situation in Berlin was so tense, we sided with Moscow. And then, after the American consulate in Posnan was ransacked as reprisal for the Cuban invasion, the State Department told us that the aid we were getting from the US would be reduced from $104 million to $60 million; and that we would not get any cotton, only wheat and other food stuffs. It was a heavy blow to us. The textile mills of Lodz were idle for months. But finally we did manage to buy some cotton for dollars and we were glad to get at least the American wheat. Then suddenly, one day in April, our Ambassador in Washington was called in a great hurry to the State Department. Not believing his own eyes, he was given an agreement to sign restoring the $44 million and permitting us to buy cotton. So in Lodz we now have even a small surplus. No sir, there will not be any American economic reprisals. Didn't you read in the newspapers that important people in Washington say that if Congress refuses to help Poland it would be a major misfortune to the United States? Note, to the United States, not to Poland!" He finished with an ironic smile.

To all these officials, engineers, economists, artists and writers, the prospect of a Western boycott is a nightmare. And as much as I sympathized with them, knowing what these contacts with the non-communist world mean to them, I could not help feeling satisfaction that the West still has some trump cards.

At one point in our conversation I always put this question: "Why do you think Kennedy should back down; don't you think Khrushchev could retreat more easily?" I found no one who thought this point of view was unreasonable. Indeed, no one even mentioned the matter of prestige or said that the Soviet leader cannot afford to lose face. On the contrary, most of the comments acknowledged that Khrushchev could retreat without risk to his position in the Soviet Union. The trouble, they added, is that if he does, East Germany could not go on any longer as it is.

I was deeply impressed by what these friends on the "Red Riviera" said about conditions under Ulbricht. Their descriptions were gloomier than most I had heard in the West. They stressed especially that East Germany no longer has the manpower to run a modern state and a modern economy. At present, there are 500 Bulgarian doctors in East Germany, but to replace doctors who have fled to the West, they are trying to recruit a few hundred more Poles, Bulgarians, and Czechs. I tried to imagine what success a Bulgarian doctor, knowing only a few words of German, would have with his German patients. If the Wartburg automobile factory is still in operation in East Germany, I was told, it is because Poles and Czechs have sent their engineers and skilled workers. The same is true of the Agfa film factory and of many many others. A young physicist from Leipzig University said that the Russians are hated more today in East Germany than they were in 1945, and that this hate is directed also against the Poles and the Czechs. East Germans say that Poland is sending them rotten potatoes in return for their East German cars and machines. A Polish official told of East German cars arriving in Poland with the inscription: "Down with the Polish swine" – and with sand in the cylinders.

However, though they are deeply concerned about East Germany, all of those I met on this sunny, enchanting Bulgarian beach were sure there would not be a real crisis over Berlin. The peoples of their countries don't want it. The leaders are afraid even of war panic. (They don't again want to see a run on their shops; there are no reserves.) Everything must be arranged peacefully.

The Common Market

The possibility of another Berlin crisis is not, however, the only thing these people would rather not think about. They are equally nervous about the Common Market. Poland's exports to Western Europe amount to some $300 million a year, and Poland sells more than $30 million to the US. (She hopes to increase it this year to $40 million.) The bulk of this consists of foodstuffs, mostly the famous Polish bacon and ham.

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Coal, once Poland's chief export, is now very hard to sell. It is this trade which enables Poland to buy goods in Western currencies which she cannot obtain from Communist countries – wool, most of the cotton she needs, many other raw materials, semi-fabricated goods, machines. Should these exports slacken or peter out altogether because of the Common Market, the Polish economy would be in desperate trouble.

Hungary's trade with the West is much smaller, but plays a similarly important role. The same is true for Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria. For all of them, the few millions of dollars, marks, francs or florins they earn are enormously precious.

Economists, foreign trade experts and bank managers frankly admitted to me that while their countries are taking part in a world-wide Communist campaign against the Common Market, and while they are trying to improve the functioning of their own economic grouping (COMECON) they are well aware that their only hope is that the Common Market countries will not close their doors altogether to Communist exports. They were quite outspoken about the failure of COMECON. I was told about an angry scene which took place at the recent gathering of the Polish Communist Central Committee. Mr. Gomulka revealed the story of a recent shipment of a raw material which Poland had to buy urgently in Switzerland, paying of course in dollars. When the goods arrived it was found out that they were of Soviet origin. The Russians had first delivered them to East Germany which had then re-sold them to the Swiss. "This is how the COMECON collaboration is in practice," Gomulka shouted.

One of the effects of liberalization inside the Soviet bloc and of the end of exploitation by Russia of the economy of satellite countries is, paradoxically enough, the return to a pure capitalistic spirit in trade relations between Communist countries. A Czech foreign trade official, who admitted that since the beginning of this year his country, once the most prosperous of the entire Soviet bloc, has been in bad shape and that meat and other products are very short, told me about his recent trip to Warsaw where he was sent to buy meat. The Poles told him that they could deliver the meat but on condition that the Czechs give them Egyptian cotton which the Czechs are getting from Nasser in exchange for arms. But the Czech official couldn't promise this, knowing his country had re-sold the cotton long ago. He offered instead some toys and glass jewelry. The Poles didn't want them and so the Czechs didn't get Polish meat. A manager of a Soviet factory producing linotypes (much valued in Western Europe) said that his factory is exporting only against payment in Western currencies. ("You can buy our machine in Paris, Zurich or Stockholm, but not in Warsaw or Prague.") A Polish economist commented that: "In our economy the production of goods for export to the West has absolute priority. If for that reason we are late in delivering goods ordered by other countries of the bloc, it doesn't bother us much. After all the Czechs and the East Germans frankly tell us that many things they promised will not be delivered."

Another interesting experience was to hear how little enthusiasm Communist officials and economists had for the uncommitted countries. Said one Pole: "The present misfortune of the Czechs is not only due to the fact that they were foolish enough to introduce 100 percent collectivisation of their agriculture two years ago; the other reason is that they lost so much money in trade with China, Guinea, Ghana and Mali. How much Cuba will cost them, and all of us, it is still too early to say."

And yet nothing would be more false than to suggest that the mood of these Communist economic experts is one of resignation. On the contrary, they are full of confidence. The most explicit expression of this long-range faith came from a professor of one of the Russian petroleum institutes. He said that while for a time the Soviets can do little against the Common Market, the situation will change when, sometime in 1964, the gigantic oil pipe line linking the Volga oil fields with Central Europe will have been completed. This pipe line will have three terminals: at Memel, on the Baltic coast; on the Oder, in East Germany; and on the Danube, at Bratislava. "We will then see if the Germans, the Belgians, the Dutch, the Swiss, the Scandinavians, can resist the temptation of our cheap oil, or if they will not follow the example of the Italians who already buy a lot of it. We will see what will then happen to the oil from Sahara, from the Middle East or Venezuela. We will see whether the solidarity of the Common Market will not then break up."

The Poles appear to be less certain that the Common Market will soon be broken up by cheap Red oil and it seemed to me that they didn't even wish it to happen. But they were confident enough that by keeping in close touch with the West, learning its methods, accepting all aid and credits the West is willing to give, a Communist country may score great gains and take a greater and greater share of international markets. They fully realize that their economic system is not the best, nor the most efficient. But having to live with it, they seem confident that peaceful competition will help them – all this on condition that the West is willing to trade with them, to extend them credits, to give them its technical and scientific achievements, to keep them informed about its technological progress. There is nothing – short of an atomic war – that Communist officials, economists and intellectuals fear more than a collapse of East-West contacts. PHILIP BEN

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Prospects for November

Why We Can Expect More of the Same

by Angus Campbell

As every politician knows, the party that wins the Presidential election nearly always loses Congressional seats in the off-year election which follows. Simply on the basis of past experience it would appear likely that even though the Republicans cannot win a majority this fall, they are pretty sure to win more seats than they now hold. This kind of prediction, however, fails to take account of the very unusual characteristics of the Kennedy election or to understand the basic relationship of Presidential and Congressional elections.

The 1960 election was the first election in this century in which a party regaining the White House after a period out of office failed to increase its representation in Congress. While winning the Presidency, the Democratic Party lost 21 seats in the House of Representatives and two seats in the Senate. In 1960 Mr. Kennedy ran further behind his ticket than any President elected since the two party system was established in the 1860's. In drawing a bare half of the two-party vote he ran a full five percentage points behind the proportion of the vote polled by the Democratic candidates for the House. Mr. Kennedy has achieved a remarkably high rating on Dr. Gallup's popularity poll since his inauguration but he trailed his ticket bady in 1960.

The reasons for Mr. Kennedy's failure to match his party's vote are not difficult to locate. Part of it is accounted for by the perennial eccentricities of Southern politics, with uncontested Congressional seats and unpledged Presidential electors resulting in a great many votes for Democratic Congressmen which are not accompanied by votes for a Democratic President. Peculiar to 1960 was the additional fact of Mr. Kennedy's Catholicism. It can be demonstrated that at least two million people who would ordinarily have voted for a Democratic candidate for President voted for Mr. Nixon in 1960 because of apprehensions regarding Mr. Kennedy's religion, a defection only partially offset by votes attracted to Mr. Kennedy because he was a Catholic. Other considerations may also have worked to Mr. Kennedy's disadvantage; he was certainly less well-known to the electorate than Mr. Nixon and was regarded by many as less experienced.

It is important to recognize these unusual qualities of the 1960 vote because the Presidential election inevitably influences the off-year election which follows. If a Presidential candidate is swept into office on a wave of personal popularity or as the result of public rejection of the opposing party, he invariably carries with him into office a number of Congressional candidates of his own party who would not have been elected if the Presidential vote had been closer to the normal division of party strength. In swinging toward the winning candidate the independent voters and some disgruntled partisans of the opposing party vote a straight party ticket and their support may decide a certain number of close districts. Two years later these winning candidates must stand by themselves without their President's name on the ballot and without the support of a national campaign. The vote now recedes in size, the independent voters tend to drop out, and the division of the vote moves back toward the basic division of party loyalties in the district. The Congressmen who were carried into office on the coattails of their Presidential candidate are likely to find themselves out of a job.

This was clearly the picture during the Eisenhower elections and the off-year elections which followed them. Republican candidates for Congress profited greatly when Mr. Eisenhower was on the ballot and they suffered grievously when he was not. In 1960 Mr. Kennedy won the election but he was not a benefit to the Democratic candidates who ran with him – if anything, he cost them votes. The basic condition which produces the typical off-year decline in the Congressional seats of the President's party is therefore absent in 1962. If the Republicans increase their representations this fall it will have to be for other reasons.

The vote for candidates for the House of Representatives in 1960 came very close to a faithful representation of the division of party strength in the electorate. Most of the Democrats voted for Democrats, most of the Republicans for Republicans, and the Independents divided their votes about equally between the two parties. Because the Democrats outnumber the Republicans, this voting pattern resulted in a 55 percent

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majority for the Democratic candidates. If we could assume that no great domestic issue, no international crisis, no persuasive personality will swing the electorate away from this normal balance, we would conclude that the division in the 88th Congress will be about the same as it is in the 87th. If any of these conditions dramatically favors one party or the other, that party will increase its number of seats.

An examination of the national vote over the last 50 years will show that it is a good deal more difficult to move the off-year Congressional vote away from its normal party balance than it is to swing the Presidential vote. This is readily understood if we take account of the fact that the off-year vote is always at least a quarter smaller than the preceding Presidential vote and that the people who drop out in the off-year are precisely the less highly motivated, less interested voters who are most ready to move from one party to the other from one election to the next. The people who turn out for an off-year vote are predominantly solid party loyalists who desert their party only under extreme circumstances. We can be sure that at least 80 percent of the people who vote in 1962 will vote for the same party they voted for in 1960. Of course, this leaves a significant proportion of floating voters, quite enough to change the character of the next Congress if they swing their votes heavily toward one party rather than the other.

Floating voters tend to be ignorant voters. Contrary to popular belief, the person who votes irregularly and shifts parties from one election to the next is much less likely to be a discriminating, well-informed citizen than the regular party loyalist who never defects and seldom splits his ticket above the level of County Sheriff. The floater follows the mass media less closely and has less information about the issues. His vote is likely to be determined by forces which are hardly more than atmospheric, impressions he gains from half-understood and largely forgotten things he has heard or read that lead him to feel in an undefined way that political affairs are going well or badly, that the party in office deserves to be sustained or punished. It is perhaps a wry perversion of the theory of popular government that the critical votes in closely contested elections should come so heavily from these poorly equipped "swing voters", but such is the case.

Off Year Apathy and Ignorance

One of the reasons for the stability of the off-year vote is the fact that the electorate pays relatively little attention to the off-year campaigns. Repeated surveys of the public have demonstrated how little heed the average citizen gives to the news of political events and how poorly informed he is about issues which have made daily headlines for weeks. Even if he becomes aware that an argument is going on he is likely to be confused as to which side his party is on and even more uncertain as to where his own Congressman stands. If he is the kind of person who informs himself about such matters he is also likely to have a strong party attachment; the less party-identified person, who might be induced to swing his vote because of some policy issue, is not likely to be listening. The result is that most of the issues that excite the Congress have virtually no direct effect on the vote, especially during an off-year election when the stakes are not as high as they are in a Presidential election and the campaign pressure is much less intense. In the present circumstance, it may be that the Medicare Bill has attracted enough public attention and is sufficiently widely identified with the Democratic Party to influence the vote, but it is not likely that any other specific policy proposal will have any visible impact nationally.

Hardly more likely to have any decisive influence on the trend of the vote in November are the candidates themselves. Diligent as these gentlemen are in trying to make themselves known to the people of their district, they are discouragingly unsuccessful. In 1958 *only one voter in four in the fall election claimed that he had heard or read something about both candidates for Congress in his district.* This was not true in every district, of course. A Congressman who succeeds in getting re-elected one term after another undoubtedly develops a considerable reputation in his district. His constituents are not likely to have much idea of what he has done in Washington but they at least become familiar with his name and they may look for it on the ballot.

It is also true that a local issue may so excite the electorate that the Congressional candidates become major actors in a clear-cut policy dispute. In the write-in campaign for Dale Alford in the Fifth District of Arkansas in 1958 the voters had heard a good deal about both Alford and the incumbent, Brooks Hays, and they had a clear perception of which of them stood closer to the traditional Southern position on civil rights. The Alford-Hays experience is an instructive example of what can happen when a candidate gets himself too prominently exposed in a position which offends an important element of public opinion in his district. But the contest in Little Rock in 1958 followed on a most extraordinary train of events and was far from typical of elections in the nation's other 434 Congressional districts.

In any case, local issues and local candidates are likely to benefit one party in one district and the other in a second. The fact that the off-year election is made up of 435 separate contests makes it virtually impossible for any local candidate or issue to move the national

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vote perceptibly. But the vote can be moved by events which have national significance, especially if they threaten the national well-being. The electorate seems to take for granted the good works of an Administration under which it has prospered but it is downright short-tempered about an Administration under which it feels it has suffered. In the fall of 1958 the country was struggling with an economic recession which had created widespread public pessimism and dissatisfaction. This is a dangerous circumstance for the party in power and the Republican delegation in the House dropped from 201 seats to 153. Part of this loss reflected the absence of Mr. Eisenhower's coattails, but the swing to the Democratic Party went far beyond what might have been attributed to this influence.

What the Polls Show

The critical question in 1962 is whether any shortcoming in the performance of the Kennedy Administration seems serious enough to the electorate to warrant punitive action. The Republican Party is bearing down hard on the failure of the Kennedy program in Congress, the deficit financing, the continued presence of Communists in Cuba, Vietnam, Laos and elsewhere, the unfriendliness of Kennedy's Administration to business, and the ubitiquitous Kennedy family. These charges no doubt stir the party faithful but they are not likely to swing many votes; they are either too poorly understood, too remote, too narrow or too partisan to have broad impact on the electorate. There are three important indications from survey evidence that the public mood is generally favorable to the Democratic Party this fall and that it is likely to escape the public censure to which incumbent parties are so prone in off-year elections.

- Mr. Kennedy is a popular President. This does not give him the power to swing the vote in any particular district by any means but it gives a positive tone to the general public impression of the Democratic Party, especially among those people who are not specifically informed about contemporary issues and are particularly susceptible to those "atmospheric" influences.
- Despite the continued presence of a hard-core of some four million unemployed people, the public's economic attitudes are relatively optimistic. In contrast to 1958, the indicators of public confidence and sense of well-being are high.
- Surprisingly, in view of the lamentable Cuban episode, the public seems to have given the Democratic Administration passing marks up to this point for its management of international affairs. One of Dr. Gallup's recent polls finds the electorate believing the Democratic Party as likely as the Republicans to keep the country out of war, a switch indeed from the Eisenhower period when the memory of Korea hung darkly on the public mind.

These favorable conditions are not likely to produce any substantial swing to the Democratic Party. If they create some Democratic inclination among the uncommitted, independent voters it will probably do no more than make up the loss the Democrats can expect from the inclination of their 1960 supporters to sit out the off-year election, while the 1960 Republican faithful return to the polls. However, these conditions do reduce the likelihood of a strong Republican surge.

There is an unusual circumstance in the 1962 election which seems likely to benefit the Democrats even though the national vote division remains at the 1960 level. As the result of the redistribution of population recorded in the 1960 census and the return of the total number of House seats from 437 to 435, 25 of the 50 states are now redefining their Congressional districts. Sixteen states will lose a total of 21 seats. Five of these states have single-party delegations in the House; in these states the Democrats must lose four seats and the Republicans two. The losses in the other states are not as easily predicted. But if one assumes that the majority party in the lower house of a state legislature can pass on the loss to the minority party, both parties will lose about eight seats. This assumption may be unjustified when the Governor is of a different party from the lower house majority, or where different parties control the two houses, but exceptions tend to cancel one another out. To these totals must be added the possibility of a few extra seats gained by the Republicans in New York State, where the majority party accomplished something really artistic by way of gerrymandering.

Nine states will gain 19 seats. If we assume again that the majority party will win the new seats in each case, either through gerrymandering or through natural party strength, the Democratic Party comes away with a very lopsided proportion of the total, perhaps as many as 17 of the 19 seats. These assumptions are undoubtedly crude; local candidates and issues will very likely produce upsets in particular districts. But if local conditions balance out across the 25 redistricting states, favoring neither party over-all, and if the Democrats are as effective in gerrymandering California as the Republicans are in New York, redistricting will probably result in some advantage to the Democratic Party.

Thus, the outlook for November is for not much change. Prospects for a significant Republican gain in the House of Representatives are poor. The unusual circumstances of redistricting may gain the Democrats a few seats but the shift will not be large. Even if the Democrats break precedent by increasing their majority, the new Congress will not look very different from the one it replaces.

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McNAMARA'S STRATEGY – III

Secretary of Defense McNamara's June 16 speech at Ann Arbor made public a new US strategy under which nuclear wars might be fought "while preserving the fabric of our societies." This strategy, which requires both sides to strike military but not civilian targets, was attacked in the July 30 issue of The New Republic *by Michael Brower as being "inextricably linked with a counterforce first-strike strategy," and by Robert Osgood, in the September 10 issue, as incompatible with "the realities of political decentralization within the (NATO) alliance." It is defended here by Morton H. Halperin, Research Associate at the Harvard Center for International Affairs and author of the forthcoming* Limited War in the Nuclear Age, *on which this article is based. Halperin argues that the new strategy is not necessarily a first-strike strategy, does not increase the danger of pre-emptive war, and need not accelerate the arms race indefinitely nor preclude arms control or disarmament; it is, he suggests, merely an attempt to limit damage if nuclear war comes.*

The "No Cities" Doctrine

by Morton H. Halperin

The evolution of American military strategy under the Kennedy Administration has reached the point where a single question has become critical: how should NATO prepare to meet all-out challenges by the Soviet Union in Western Europe? Two contingencies are interpreted as all-out challenges in Europe – an effort to eliminate Western rights in Berlin and a massive Soviet military attack in central Europe, whether conventional or nuclear.

The position of this and the previous Administration as expressed in the Kennedy-Alsop interview and on a number of other occasions is that the United States is prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons if this is necessary to defend major Western rights in Central Europe. Few critics of the Administration's policy have been prepared to argue that the United States could at the present time renounce the first-use of nuclear weapons. They have, however, argued that NATO should not continue indefinitely to rely on nuclear threats to deter major conventional aggression. These critics have urged the US to begin preparing itself and its allies to meet all conventional attacks with conventional responses. Despite the fact that there is considerable support for this position within the Administration, the President has been reluctant to take this step.

At least until recently the most publicized and discussed change in American military policy was the increased emphasis being put on conventional and paramilitary forces. The President brought into office with him a number of individuals who believed as he did that undue stress had been put on nuclear weapons. They did not believe that we had invested too much in our *strategic* nuclear forces, but rather that we had put too much emphasis on *tactical* nuclear weapons and had left ourselves with insufficient capacity to engage in conventional ground or air warfare. With the impetus of the Berlin crisis, and hence the need to make decisions on how force might be used, the number of active Army combat divisions has been increased by five, and for the first time in the nuclear age the Pentagon has devoted substantial resources to research and development for new conventional weapons. Air- and sea-lifts have been strengthened and the Administration has created the STRICOM, a combination of Army combat forces and tactical fighters.

This evolution, Administration officials have continually said, does not mean less emphasis on the use of nuclear weapons, but simply more emphasis on the use of conventional forces. Such a clearly contradictory assertion is the result solely of the Administration's policy toward major military action in Europe. While the President might be prepared to say that we can and will meet all of our obligations elsewhere in the world without resorting to nuclear weapons, he is clearly not prepared to apply this statement to Europe.

It is thus in relation to Europe that the paradox of increased reliance on conventional forces but no re-

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duced reliance on nuclear weapons has come into focus. The Administration has proposed a substantial increase in NATO's conventional capability. It has built up American forces and is pressing our European allies to increase substantially their conventional capability in ground forces and tactical air forces. However, the Administration has not been able to state a doctrine which satisfactorily explains the urgency of the build-up. The notion of the "pause" has been re-emphasized to explain the requirement for conventional forces. According to this concept, the purpose of conventional forces in Europe is to hold long enough for the Russians to recognize that they are engaged in a "serious" military operation which might have unfortunate consequences, and to give the Russians an opportunity to stop before the West is forced to resort to nuclear weapons. The ground forces are no longer seen as a trip-wire but as a rather more impressive force, designed not to hold indefinitely but to buy time in which to convince the opponent of our determination.

But so far as I can discover no Administration official has ever attempted to explain why the proposed 30 division defense against Soviet attack would be a more convincing demonstration of our resolve than the present 22 division defense. Both, according to the Administration, are doomed to failure in a relatively short time, although of course the larger force could hold out somewhat longer. If the present 22 divisions are in fact sufficient to achieve the proclaimed purpose of 30 divisions, it is only fair to ask why the US and its European allies should make major (albeit clearly acceptable) sacrifices to move from 22 to 30.

Unless the United States is prepared to propose to its European allies the goal of the development of a NATO conventional defense, there may not be a sufficiently clear rationale in the long run for a major build-up in conventional forces. In his Michigan speech, Secretary McNamara hinted at this strategy, arguing that it was difficult to believe that an alliance as rich and large as NATO could not meet a conventional threat from the Soviet Union. But the Secretary stopped short of declaring that it is the objective of the United States to build up within the NATO alliance a conventional force capable of meeting any Soviet conventional attack. Such a statement, even if made in private, would undoubtedly have caused considerable consternation in Europe, although in the long run it may well be the only way of securing the kind of quantitative and qualitative conventional capability which the Administration wants. Such a statement might, however, also increase European interest in national nuclear forces.

Secretary McNamara's failure to come out for a conventional defense against a conventional attack has caused considerable uneasiness. To many, including Michael Brower (*New Republic*, July 30), the speech seemed to be a dangerous attempt to increase the credibility of an American first nuclear strike in certain extreme contingencies.

The major innovation which was announced in the speech was that the US would seek to conduct strategic nuclear operations without bombing cities. Mr. McNamara's apparent aim was, first, to tell the Russians, the American people, and our allies about a policy which in effect had been previously adopted by the Administration; and second, to explain in this context the strategic reasons for our opposition to a proliferation of nuclear capabilities among our allies. The speech has apparently been widely misunderstood and has come in for a number of invalid criticisms. Before considering these, I propose to sketch briefly what it seems to me the Secretary was saying.

What McNamara Said

Secretary McNamara was simply saying that the United States had removed cities from the first priority American target list. Henceforth, he implied, whether the US went first or second in a strategic nuclear war, it would not attack Soviet cities unless the Soviets had previously destroyed American cities. Mr. McNamara was stating that there was no good military reason to target civilian population centers in the event of strategic nuclear war. He pointed out that the damage to both the US and its allies and to the Soviet Union would be considerably less if a war were fought without bombing cities. He noted that no matter who struck first the US was, by avoiding Soviet cities and holding forces in reserve which could devastate almost all of the Soviet Union in the event that Western cities came under attack, giving the strongest possible incentive to the Soviets to avoid attacking Western cities. The Secretary stated that the strategy would give the greatest hope of preserving the fabric of Western society in the event of nuclear war, but he recognized that nuclear war would be an unprecedented catastrophe whether or not cities were attacked, and he indicated that there could be no certainty that cities would not be attacked before a nuclear war was brought to a halt.

At first glance it seems difficult to understand why a statement that the US will not gratuitously destroy Soviet cities in the event of a war should lead to much uneasiness on the part of critics of American military strategy. It is very difficult to argue that one prefers a strategy whereby the US would attempt to kill a large number of Soviet citizens even though this did not reduce the expected damage to the United States. (In fact, it would probably work in the opposite direction, while contributing neither to the effectiveness of the American military strike nor to the possibility of bringing

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the war to an end before the total military power of both sides had been used.)

The most fundamental misunderstanding of the no-cities strategy expounded by Secretary McNamara seems to be the assumption that it is viable only in the situation where the US has overwhelmingly superior strategic forces and strikes first. Although the strategy is likely to be most effective in limiting damage in the case where the United States has overwhelming superiority and does strike first, its usefulness is not limited to this case. In fact, regardless of the nature of the strategic balance, the wholesale bombing of Soviet cities will not be in the interest of the US.

What Will the Soviets Do?

As Administration statements have made clear, the United States currently enjoys a massive strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. It is American quantitative superiority and the relative vulnerability of Soviet strategic forces that would enable the United States both to attack most of the Soviet strategic force and to hold a reserve to threaten city destruction. Given this balance, critics argue that the Soviets would have no reason to agree to the adoption of the no-cities strategy by both sides. In fact, the Soviets are unlikely publicly to accept a no-cities strategy as long as their strategic forces are highly vulnerable to a Western attack.

Nevertheless, it needs to be recognized that even given the current imbalance of strategic forces, and even assuming that the United States struck first in a well co-ordinated attack and the Soviets responded with a no-cities counter-force second strike, the collateral damage to the US and its NATO allies would be great – so great so that the Soviets could be confident that the US would not attack out of the blue. What the Soviets ought to fear is that the West might, if pushed to the wall either in Berlin or in central Europe as a whole, launch a strategic nuclear attack. If the alternatives were conventional defeat or else a massive use of tactical nuclear weapons which would destroy Western Europe, the US might prefer to attempt a "no-cities" strategic war. This possibility should give the Soviets an incentive to avoid maximum pressure on the West, and it is difficult to make a case that this is bad from the point of view of the West. If the Soviets do not apply such pressure they should, even with the present balance of nuclear forces, feel confident that the US will be deterred from a first strike. They therefore have no reason to pre-empt unless they plan a major provocation which seems almost certain to trigger US nuclear retaliation.

Should war nevertheless come by accident or miscalculation, they would share with the US an interest in avoiding city destruction and bringing the war to an end as quickly as possible. The extension of the war to city targets would involve much greater destruction in the Soviet Union than in the US and Western Europe, whereas confining the war to strategic targets would probably result in greater civil damage in Western Europe and the US than in the Soviet Union. Thus, even if a war should come with the present strategic imbalance, the Soviets would have a massive incentive to fight a no-cities war, although they may not acknowledge this in advance.

Should the Soviets, either because they fear an American first strike (a threat they claim to have seen in the McNamara speech), or simply because they develop a better understanding of strategy, decide to build better protected and larger strategic forces, the policy of avoiding cities would continue to be in the interests of both sides. In the case of relative qualitative and quantitative parity, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, whether it went first or second, could hope to destroy most of the opponent's strategic forces. However, the alternatives are not simply attacking invulnerable missile sites or bombing cities. There is a third alternative, which is implicit in the McNamara strategy, of simply holding a much larger part of the force in reserve. Both sides will continue to have vulnerable targets such as airfields and radar stations which can profitably be attacked in a nuclear war. However, if both sides have strategic forces so hardened and dispersed that one only "wastes" missiles in attacking them, both sides may simply withhold very large parts of their strategic forces. Implicit in McNamara's speech was the message to the Soviets that we will not attack cities simply because we have no other targets for our strategic forces.

In short, if both sides have well-protected forces, nuclear war, if it comes, may be much slower that what we now envision. It may involve attacks on strategic forces which are vulnerable or whose vulnerability is discovered or develops during the war; or attacks on tactical military targets or on economic targets (such as oil fields) which are not close to major population centers. Perhaps it needs to be re-emphasized that I am not asserting, nor I take it is the Administration, that a nuclear war will *necessarily* follow this pattern or that cities are certain to be spared. I am simply saying that it is *possible* that a nuclear war would be fought this way, and that it is in the interests of the United States to do everything it can to see that a war, if it does come, does not involve city targeting. Our primary objective remains the deterrence of any nuclear war.

In attacking the no-cities strategy, critics have pointed to the problem of the "empty" missile hole and of the vacated airfield, suggesting that in fact there would be no suitable targets for a counter-

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force second strike. While it is undoubtedly true that a counter-force attack will be more effective in a first-strike situation, it is nevertheless true, as Robert E. Osgood has noted (*The New Republic*, September 10), that there will be a considerable number of counter-force targets in a second strike. Even after a side has attacked it will have airfields from which planes have not taken off and staging bases at which planes can stop on the way to an attack or to which they can return to be re-loaded and sent back. In addition, some missiles might not have fired on schedule and might still be targets. According to Hanson Baldwin, the Soviets have the capability of firing two missiles from each launcher. If this is so, their missile launchers will be important targets even after the first missile has been fired. There are also a number of defensive targets which might be attacked, including anti-missile sites, the radar for anti-aircraft sites, communications (if we decide to attack these) and perhaps tactical military targets if a local war is in progress. There will then be a number of urgent counter-force targets remaining even after a Soviet first strike; the rest of the force might be withheld rather than engaging in senseless city destruction.

A counter-force doctrine, it is argued, places great importance on striking first and hence increases the likelihood of a pre-emptive war in which one side attacks out of fear that it is about to be attacked. However, it is not the particular strategy of one side or the other which is a major determinant of the danger of pre-emption, but rather the vulnerability of strategic forces. It is difficult to believe that whichever side struck first would refrain from attacking any strategic forces of the other side which could be easily destroyed. I doubt that even a staunch proponent of a minimum-deterrence counter-city strategy would argue that if the US found itself in a nuclear war it should avoid destroying vulnerable Soviet missile and airfield sites, or would argue that if the Soviets attack first they might pass up these targets. Thus, in a situation where both sides are vulnerable and both recognize that their strategic forces might be destroyed, there will be an acute danger of pre-emption whether or not we officially espouse a no-cities doctrine.

However, once one side moves, as the United States seems to have, into a position where a large part of its force cannot be taken out in a surprise attack, pre-emption does not seem to be a very serious danger. At the present time the Soviets have no incentive to pre-empt. Even a well-executed pre-emptive counter-force attack would use up their arsenal and leave them disarmed. As long as there is any hope that the US is not about to strike, the Soviets are more likely to reduce the local threat which is creating the danger of US pre-emption than to pre-empt themselves.

The United States, likewise, because of its relatively superior position has little reason to pre-empt and much reason to try to discover ways to use its relative superiority to force the Soviets to withdraw their pressure in the local area. Once both sides have invulnerable strategic forces the danger of pre-emption is low regardless of the strategies involved.

It is frequently asked why a side would waste its missiles in attacking the invulnerable missile forces of the other side in a first blow. This is a fair question, but it needs also to be asked why either side would waste its missile forces in an attack on cities which would only lead to great devastation in its own country. When both sides have well-protected strategic forces, neither is likely to have a sufficient incentive to launch a major first strike against any targets. There will remain, however, a danger of inadvertent or accidental war, or a war begun by one side or the other in great desperation. Because this contingency will always remain and it is difficult to assign any clear probability to it, it is important to do what can be done in the pre-war period to enhance the likelihood that destruction will be reduced and that the war will come to an end before all the forces are used. Prior to the Michigan speech the Pentagon had taken a number of steps in this direction, including placing great emphasis on the controlled use of strategic forces, on the need for good command and control, and on the need to develop forces which one is confident could ride out an attack and be used in a way related to the political objectives of the United States. In a sense the no-cities doctrine is simply a logical extension of this policy. The Administration is saying that the avoidance of city destruction will reduce the catastrophic nature of nuclear war and increase the likelihood of it being ended before all the weapons on both sides are used.

Some Legitimate Questions

It is the emphasis in the Michigan speech on the increased probability that nuclear war would not necessarily mean the end of Western society that has raised what seem to me to be some legitimate questions about the place of a no-cities strategy in American military policy. These relate back to the question of American initiation of the use of nuclear weapons. Some of the interpretations of the McNamara speech argued that he meant to say in effect that the US could continue to rely on a nuclear threat to meet some conventional attacks and that it could do so because it had now developed a strategy which "guaranteed" that nuclear war would not be a total catastrophe. There is much in the speech and elsewhere, however, that makes clear that the Administration, including the President and Secretary McNamara, recognize that nuclear war,

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even fought in this way, would be an unprecedented catastrophe and that there could of course be no guarantee that cities would not be attacked before a nuclear war could be brought to a halt. Nevertheless, to some extent the speech did represent an attempt to enhance the credibility of an American first strike in situations in which the Soviets are applying extreme pressure in Berlin or in central Europe in general.

If the Administration was indicating by the speech that it is holding back from urging the adoption of a strategy which aimed at defending Europe against a conventional attack with conventional forces, then, as Osgood has argued, it is to be deeply regretted. In the short run, the Administration may feel that it will gain some mileage out of enhancing the credibility of an American strategic nuclear response to conventional aggression in the period of American nuclear superiority and Western conventional inferiority.

But even if the US were to renounce the use of nuclear force to deal with Berlin or some other European problem, the USSR would hardly assume that nuclear war had become impossible. No matter what the US may say publicly the Soviets will be deterred to some extent by the possibility that war might escalate. The issue is not whether the US should officially remove the threat of general war as part of its means of defending Berlin and Western Europe; it is rather whether the US should rely primarily on this unavoidable threat or whether it should plan on a conventional defense, recognizing that despite its best efforts a nuclear war may come.

If the US is prepared to commit itself to a conventional defense, then the stress on a no-cities strategy should not cause any uneasiness by seeming to add to the likelihood of an American attack even under extreme circumstances. Rather it will be an important part of the effort to reduce the consequences of a general war if it occurs despite our best efforts to avoid it.

Counterforce and Arms Control

There remains the question of the effect which the adoption of a no-cities strategy has on the possibilities for negotiation of arms control agreements of various kinds. Most of the people who raise this objection are thinking in terms of a formally-negotiated international agreement reducing strategic forces to very low levels, leading ultimately to total and complete disarmament. It is legitimate, it seems to me, to raise in return the question as to what is the probability of this kind of an agreement regardless of the particular military strategy adopted by the US. It seems to me difficult to argue that it is very high. This raises the question whether the US should reject a policy which on all other counts seems to be the best one simply because it reduces the already exceedingly low probability of a formally-negotiated comprehensive disarmament agreement. Furthermore, the difficulties in the way of such agreement do not seem to me likely to be reduced by the adoption of a no-cities policy by the US. If one focuses, moreover, on less ambitious arms control agreements, or on tacit or informal arms arrangements, then it does not seem to be the case that the adoption of a no-cities strategy accelerates the arms race or reduces the possibility of arms control agreements. In fact a tacit US-USSR agreement not to target cities would be an important arms control measure.

The adoption of a no-cities strategy does not necessarily require the US to go on building missiles at a continually accelerating rate. If the Soviets develop relatively invulnerable, hard, dispersed, or mobile missile systems it simply will not pay for the US to develop forces which might increase by very small percentages the possibility of destroying a given percentage of the total Soviet missile force. The size of the American missile force is and must be – whether we are. In fact, the cost of doing so will be prohibitive strategy – related to the size and quality of the Soviet force. The Administration is not inherently committed by its no-cities policy to maintaining a force which is as superior to the Soviet forces as our current forces are. In fact, the cost of doing so would be prohibitive if the Soviets develop relatively invulnerable forces. As long as they do not do so, the currently-programmed forces will be sufficient to maintain American superiority. If the Soviets decide to develop sophisticated invulnerable systems, they can make meaningful superiority impossible. This should mean a leveling-off of the quantitative arms race whether or not both sides adopt a counter-force posture. The emphasis on avoiding city destruction may bring more sharply into focus the shared interest of both sides in avoiding war or in reducing the expected damage should war occur. It thus may facilitate negotiation of communications systems between the two sides, accident-prevention agreements, and other less ambitious arms control arrangements aimed at exploiting the perceived mutual interest of the two countries.

The doctrine of avoiding city destruction is, it seems to me, a logical part of the evolving American strategy, placing emphasis on controlled use of military force and the development of a range of options to deal with different threats to Western security. The application of these principles has carried us very far from the time a short while ago when the United States believed itself to be dependent on nuclear weapons to defend many of its vital interests. It is time now for the US to move into the position where it feels and asserts that it is prepared to defend all of its vital interests against conventional attack by conventional means.

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Pilgrim of the Audile-Tactile

by John Simon

If there is anything that characterizes this rather characterless age in which we live, it is its inability to make choices. In politics, it seems impossible to choose between disarmament and an arms race, and perfectly well-meaning people find themselves embracing both. Gone are the simple-minded days when one talked peace and meant war;

The Gutenberg Galaxy
by Marshall McLuhan
(Toronto; $5.95)

now one talks peace and *means* peace, yet also prepares for, and prepares, war. Socially speaking, one dare not choose anything but conformism; but publicly speaking, one cannot choose to extol anything but independent thought. Emotionally, to chose a mate becomes harder and harder, but to opt openly for noncommitment is harder still. The great advocate of the supremacy and goodness of science spends most of his time writing bad novels, and the practitioners of that purest of all arts, music, expend most of their efforts on reducing it to mathematico-physical laboratory experiments. Under the sway of nuclear physics and Freud, the would-be artist paints the dance of the electrons or the hostilities of the subconscious; and the brilliant intellectual is consumed by his desperate attempts to be both a guiding light and the plainest of regular guys. We dare not choose either specialization or breadth, but dream of a magic formula combining both, and in the pursuit of this Both-in-One, our highest mathematics become an abortive poetry, and our poetry an aborted algebra.

The inability to choose is probably nowhere more evident than in the current English language, in which structural linguistics is by way of creating a new, organized "chaoticism," vastly superior in confusion to any former, merely disorganized, chaos. Before *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* arrived on the scene, it was possible only – to various degrees, to be sure – to know or not know English. Thanks to this masterpiece of noncommitment, however, it is now possible, by memorizing twenty equally endorsed pronunciations of one word, to know exactly how not to know; or, by not being able to accept twenty choices, not to know how to know. And this triumph of relativity need only be accepted absolutely, to enable us presently, by making us both relativists and absolutists, to shirk even that last remaining choice.

As might be expected, the apologists of the choiceless society were hardly likely to keep us waiting for their appearance. As might further be expected, the gigantic task of defending the choice of choicelessness was not going to be undertaken by any casual casuist, but would require the emergence of men with considerable resourcefulness, erudition, and authority. Such a one is Professor McLuhan of the University of Toronto whose press has just published his new book, *The Gutenberg Galaxy*, a study of the starring role of typography played in the shaping of human thought and life. The thesis of the book is that man was once tribal and fully developed in all his senses, *i.e.*, in the jargon of the trade, "audile-tactile"; "Touch," McLuhan suggests, "is not so much a separate sense as the very interplay of the senses." But the invention of the phonetic alphabet and, particularly, of printing, stressed man's visual-conceptual orientation and development, until everything from his politics to his art, from his science to his commerce, became lineal, sequential, organized according to a perspective and logic that were merely the hypertrophy and hegemony of the visual or conceptual. But the coming of the telegraph, films, radio, television and other mass media, which demand the use of various senses and which reduce the world to a tribal village, creates a new revolution comparable to the typographic one but in the inverse direction. McLuhan claims that if we can understand the nature of this revolution, we can avoid being its victims. Perhaps, then, it would be more accurate to describe him, not as the apologist, but as the dupe of the new technologies.

As McLuhan summarizes his book, the typographic world "is the method of the fixed or specialist point of view that insists on repetition as the criterion of truth and practicality. Today our science and method strive not toward a point of view but to discover how not to have a point of view, the method not of closure and perspective but of the open 'field' and suspended judgment. Such is now the only viable method under electronic conditions of simultaneous information movement and total human interdependence." It follows that McLuhan's hero and model should be Harold Innis who, he alleges, "was the first person to hit upon the *process* of change as implicit in the *forms* of media technology. The present book," McLuhan continues, "is a footnote of explanation to his work." Innis, we are told, "is not reporting anybody's point of view, least of all his own. He is setting up a mosaic configuration or galaxy for insight." And what sort of thing does Innis arrive at with his galactic or "field" method of no point of view? McLuhan quotes him: "The effect of the discovery of printing was evident in the savage religious wars of the 16th and 17th Centuries. Application of power to communication industries hastened the consolidation of vernaculars, the rise of nationalism, revolution, and new outbreaks of savagery in the 20th Century." (One hates to think what

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Mr. Innis' statements would be like if he had a point of view.) Late in the book, McLuhan announces: "The present volume to this point might be regarded as a gloss on [this] single text of Harold Innis."

Let us consider, for the sake of our survival as readers and writers in the global village of the structuralist age, how Mr. McLuhan's book without a point of view is put together. It is, as he says himself, a footnote, but a footnote made up of footnotes. I would guess that it is about three quarters quotations, with the remaining quarter chiefly a connecting text introducing and commenting on the quotations, but also slipping in some assertions startling in their boldness and, occasionally, their irreconcilability. To turn his book "audile-tactile," he divides it into short, overlapping chapters which tend to have as little beginning and end as possible, and which may consist, for example, of quotations from Dom Jean Leclercq's *The Love of Learning and the Desire of God*, W. W. Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth*, Frazer's *The Golden Bough*, and the Opies' *Lore and Language of Schoolchildren* cheek by jowl. Such chapters are introduced by superscriptions in twenty-point bold face italics, and may read – or roar – as follows: "*Heidegger surfboards along on the electronic wave as triumphantly as Descartes rode the mechanical wave.*" Or, yet more "audiac" (to use a term from the book): "*Pope's* Dunciad *indicts the printed book as the agent of a primitivistic and Romantic revival. Sheer visual quantity evokes the magical resonance of the tribal horde. The box office looms as a return to the echo chamber of bardic incantation.*" Such configurational headlines, reminiscent of Joyce's Cave of the Winds, but meant quite seriously to reach the inner ear, are further removed from the visual and sequential by sometimes having precious little to do with the chapter itself. To make the book more of a "field," page numbers appear only on the rectos, so that one must frequently swivel one's head (a tactile phenomenon) to find out on what page one is. The book, moreover, is full of the new words of the electronic tribe: analogate, auditorially, haptic, specialisms, decentralism, etc.; as well as phrases like "civil defence against media fall-out," "Greek celature as a take-off strip for medieval manuscript culture," or "the Montaigne kodak trick of snapshotting moments," and other such felicities, meant, perhaps, to activate our olfactory sense as well.

Underneath it all, McLuhan plays the history-of-ideas game, and plays it, I am afraid, none too well. Though he avers that what is bad is not print culture but only its effect on those who do not comprehend its bias, distinctions certainly become blurred when McLuhan blames "the Gutenberg galaxy" for everything from the "compartmentalizing of human potential" to the French Revolution, and speaks of "the natural victims of print" and "people reduced to things" by it. Furthermore, McLuhan does not have the encyclopedic learning with which to back up his generalizations: often we feel that a single book on a large topic holds him in thrall, and a vast historical question is supposed to be resolved by a single contemporary quotation. With medieval deference to authority, McLuhan keeps making his obeisance to this or that "major work" or "grand study" – favorite critical terms of his. One's confidence is further shaken by references to the Bavarian composer, Carl Orff as a Viennese musician, or to Umberto Boccioni, whose painting was far more important, as just a sculptor. It is, then, typical for McLuhan to make a contestable generalization about Spanish culture on the basis of two books (one a collection of essays by various hands), quotations from which are used, to say the least, deviously; thus Casalduero's statement that Don Quixote and Sancho "are of the same nature with a difference in proportion" is supposed to demonstrate that print in Spain was "effecting a new ratio in the senses."

Indeed, this is McLuhan's worst fail-

Creatures of Earth

I worked in sorrow among
the summer's relentless beetles,
lifting leaves with larvae
and egg-clusters and crushed them,
but with an uneasy conscience
I'd look up at the sky
to catch an omniscient,
retributive to God frown down
from his unassailable heaven,
seeking cause to show Him
a tortured bean or carrot
in justification that man
must further his peaceful needs
with this kind of slaughter.

I turned to the helpmeet wife
who patiently dropped bugs and
caterpillars into a paper bag,
and asked: "Do you too sense
a Being, feel a reprimand,
a rebuke or a reproof?"
Compassionately she showed
me a polka-dotted lady beetle,
and answered: "Look what I
nearly condemned to death.
Now it and I will carry on
with new vengeance together.
Who came by, did you say?
And what did he want?"

DAVID CORNEL DEJONG

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ing: the wholesale reinterpretation of texts to prove his preconceived argument. He offers lengthy misreadings of *King Lear*, *The Dunciad*, and *Finnegans Wake*, among others; but let me cite here a few of the numerous shorter ones. Thus he quotes Dyer's well-known poem, "My Mind to me a Kingdom is; / Such perfect joy therein I find / That it excels all other bliss / Which God or Nature hath assigned" as evidence of "the power of print to install the reader in a subjective universe of limitless freedom and spontaneity." Again, Shakespeare's Sonnet LX, in which our minutes "Like as the waves . . . / Each changing place with that which goes before, / In sequent toil all forwards do contend," is proof to McLuhan that Shakespeare was against "lineal denudation of language" and the "mechanical repetition" inaugurated by print. If Adam Smith says that in commercial societies thinking becomes the business of a few people who furnish the public with reason, to McLuhan this means that "the intellectual is to tap the collective consciousness," which two lines later becomes "the massive unconsciousness"; forthwith Adam Smith's meaning is that the Gutenberg society casts the intellectual "in the role of the primitive seer." Irresponsibility becomes absurdity when, for example, McLuhan quotes the octave of Sonnet LXXV from the *Amoretti* as alleged proof of a point, but omits the sestet, a palinode in which Spenser himself refutes what went before.

Even more remarkable are Mr. McLuhan's contradictions, as when Euclidean geometry is still so "tactile-muscular" that later scholars criticized it for its pusillanimity, but Euclidean space is "linear, flat, straight, uniform" and a product of that literacy which, in turn, produced print culture. Film, which is sometimes viewed as part of the new electronic age, at other times becomes part of the Gutenberg galaxy: "Montaigne had all the experiences and techniques of the impressionist film . . . both modes . . . are direct extrapolations of typography." It will take a few decades to understand fully the impact of TV – "today it is futile to discuss it at all"; but we learn that Professor McLuhan is already at work on *Understanding Media*, in which he addresses himself to this and similar matters. Such inconsistency is one form of abdication of choice; another one is the hiding behind an alter ego like Harold Innis.

McLuhan's conclusion is that visual orientation resulted in the fiasco of "mechanical matching, not imaginative making . . . in the arts and sciences, in politics and education until our own time." But when it comes to suggestions for dealing with the present cultural crisis which, true apologist or dupe that he is, he does not fully recognize ("Today we live on the frontier between five centuries of mechanism and the new electronics, between the homogeneous and the simultaneous. It is painful but fruitful."), he offers no more help than he did in his previous book, *The Mechanical Bride*. There we read: "Why not use the new commercial education as a means to enlightening the interested prey? Why not assist the public to observe consciously the drama which is intended to operate upon it unconsciously?" Like Poe's sailor, we are supposed to study the maelstrom, and so discover the way out. But that is a faulty analogy. Beyond Poe's maelstrom was safety; beyond the trends that engulf our world there is no terra firma, no other world. And it is not typography or the sequential view that does us in, but any multiplication and vulgarization of ideas: the fact that the masses demand mass-production – in a way which Ruskin and Morris could not foresee, and which McLuhan's "field" view avoiding choice cannot concede – spells the end of culture, typographical or otherwise. I do not know just what about television, for example, Professor McLuhan would have us understand. How the tube works? The shoddiness of sponsors, agencies, and programs? The cloddishness of the public which dooms attempts at improvement? How would that help us to anything but choiceless acquiescence? It seems preferable to hold on to the pitifully individualistic, non-audile-tactile values of print culture: for the betterment of life, it is not death that needs understanding, but life.

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

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The Bop Brotherhood

by Neil Leonard

In the late 1930's and early 40's a group of young Negro jazzmen – notably Charlie Parker, Dizzy Gillespie, Charlie Christian, Thelonius Monk, and Max Roach – created a strikingly new kind of music. Later called bop, it first sounded dissonant and meaningless to all but a handful of listeners. The rest scorned or ignored it. Bop musicians and their few fellow travelers reacted to their rejection by disdaining non-sympathizers as "squares" and closing ranks in an unofficial brotherhood. For its most avid supporters, the new music became virtually a religion, revealed and upheld with evangelical zeal. They adopted an aesthetic morality, which as far as possible made the music the be all and end all of existence and excluded many of the values of the unfriendly majority. They lived for "kicks," both musical and non-musical. Unconventional and sometimes bizarre forms of dress, language, humor, sexual behavior, and sometimes the use of dope went hand in hand with the electrifying new music.

Bird: The Legend of Charlie Parker
by George Robert Reisner
(Citadel; $4.95)

The hero who emerged as a rallying point for the bop brotherhood was the late alto saxophonist Charlie Parker, known to initiates, both Negro and white, as "Bird." He had a charismatic personality. His impeccable rhythms, astoundingly fast execution, powerful dramatic sense, and seemingly endless reservoir of musical ideas combined to galvanize the sensibilities of the hipsters. He seemed years ahead of his contemporaries and his numerous imitators and fans have created a vivid image of him. This image is the subject of George Robert Reisner's book. The book is largely made up of recollections about Parker by his admirers, but it also contains a complete Parker discography, numerous illustrations, and a brief chronology.

Born in 1920, Parker grew up in Kansas City where jazz flourished during the Depression. His short life was full of afflictions and contradictions. He suffered from heart disease, liver trouble, and ulcers. In his last ten years he attempted suicide at least twice and spent time in mental institutions. At an early age he acquired the drug habit which haunted him until his death. He had an infectious, childlike personality which was hard to dislike, but for his close associates he was unpredictable and difficult. At one time he would be charming, at another suspicious, at still another cruel. Employers found him highly undependable. Some of them insisted on paying him by the set because he might arrive late or not at all, and had a tendency to wander away from the bandstand for long intervals. When one impressario hired a detective to chauffeur him about and keep track of him during a concert series, he escaped on the first night in the detective's car and failed to turn up for the rest of the concerts. He possessed an enormous appetite for all kinds of experience which he indulged. He ate great quantities of food, drank a lot, and had at least four wives in 15 years. He playfully broke inconvenient laws and involved himself endlessly in purposeless pranks. But at times he showed great intelligence, as when he said, "Music is your own experience, your thoughts, your wisdom. If you don't live it, it won't come out of your horn. They tell you there's a boundary line to music. But, man, there's no boundary line to art." He was dissatisfied with his work and the musical boundaries of his time and was constantly seeking something more expressive. Toward the end of his life he wanted to study with Edgar Varese and Hindemith, and to write a jazz ballet. In 1955 at the age of 34 he died of a heart attack in the Manhattan apartment of the Baroness de Koenigswarter.

As in the case of other legendary figures the image that comes down to us seems to reflect as much the psychological needs of its authors as actual circumstances. Reisner explains in his introductory essay that hipsters took Parker as the living justification of their philosophy. Many imitated his dress and his use of narcotics, as well as his musical style. His performances stirred many to play beyond their ordinary capabilities. Max Roach, the drummer, said, "Bird was kind of like the sun, giving aff the energy we drew from him. His cup was overflowing . . . and this inspired anyone who was on the bandstand." For his followers he seemed to be the embodiment of their aesthetic morality. As the name "Bird" suggests he appeared as a free spirit. His kicks were kingsize. Admirers reported that he could not play or hear enough music, that he begged owners to keep clubs where he performed open beyond the normal closing hour. It is reported that he never refused a challenge whether it was a water-drinking contest or an attempt to ride a horse into a barroom. And he seemed to perform superhuman feats. Howard McGhee, the trumpeter, tells that before a performance Parker could consume a quart of whiskey, a handful of benzedrine, smoke marijuana and still *"stand up like a man"* and play beautifully. Others related how he could fall asleep on the bandstand in the middle of a number. When his turn for a solo came, someone would yell "Bird" and he would immediately jump from his chair and play inspirationally. There seemed to be something otherworldly about him. The word musicians used most frequently in connection with him was "soul." After he had begun to decline physically one of them said, "Bird has disentegrated into pure sound," and after he died, his disciples scrawled "Bird lives" on subway walls.

Reisner's book suffers from poor organization. The author apparently reproduced the various interviews *in toto*

"THE TRUTH IS *that we cannot contain Cuba – now that it has become an active base of the world Communist enterprise – any more than we could contain the Soviet Union. Through Cuba, by all the mechanisms of Communist political warfare, Communist power will spread, will inevitably spread, elsewhere in the Caribbean, in Central and South America; is already spreading. Every day the road back will be harder; thus every day decision will become more difficult.*"

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and their order of presentation is alphabetical by the interviewed person's last name. As a result, comments on the same topic are widely separated, and there is a good deal of repetition and some extraneous material. More editing with attention to chronology and ordering of subjects and further editorial comment would have helped. What there is clears up some of the exaggeration and contradictions but many remain.

Yet the book is fascinating. Reisner has not only told us more about Parker and his image, he has provided a psychological portrait of a generation of jazz musicians. We have an idea of how they lived, what they thought, and – what most books on jazz cannot tell us – how they *felt*.

Goose-Grease for the President

by Gerald W. Johnson

The biographer of Mencken would be, I think, the first to admit that his latest opus is of the class that Mencken callously termed "goose-grease." It is a biography of a President still in office and such works inevitably fall into one of two classifications – if they aren't goose-grease, they are corrosive sublimate. Manchester is no John T. Flynn; he feels not the faintest impulse to poison Kennedy, so of necessity he praises him, which, of course, will revolt all would-be poisoners.

Portrait of a President
by William Manchester
(Little, Brown; $4.75)

Neutrals, however, understanding from the start that the book is a friendly one, will find it illuminating. Manchester is far too good a craftsman to lay it on with a trowel. For instance, he makes no effort to palliate the folly of the abortive Cuban invasion; but he does insist upon its educational value. Through this affair Kennedy learned right at the start one of the harshest truths about the Presidency, namely, that when supremely important decisions are involved the President can rely on no judgment except his own.

The book follows Kennedy through his first year and a half, roughly from the Bay of Pigs to Big Steel, but it is not a history of the Administration. It is a study of the development of character under terrific stress, and in such a study apparently trivial incidents are often more revealing than thunderous pronunciamentos. Manchester is adept at selecting the revealing triviality, which means that his pages are fascinating reading to people who would be bored to extinction by economic, political, or statistical analysis. It is frankly, one may say scrupulously, anecdotal, rather than historical; which is to say, it is an effort to picture a man, rather than a public figure. The fact that he is a public figure is, of course, what justifies the effort, but it does not control the process.

The effect, however, is ambivalent. Few readers will finish the book without an increased liking for John F. Kennedy; but they will also acquire a sharper realization of what he is up against, which is not tranquilizing. The Presidency is monstrous. It is so even in moments of relative serenity, and in crises it makes Moloch look like a benevolent deity. Add to this the revelation that the incumbent's physical health is more precarious than most people had realized and a considerable anxiety is the inevitable effect.

In sum, what Manchester gives us is a picture of a brave, honorable and resolute man struggling with problems that may well be beyond his, or any human capacity to solve. It is fascinating, appealing and, like all great drama, enchanting. But it is not soothing.

Notes on Contributors

John Simon *is drama critic of* The Hudson Review. David Cornel DeJong *is the author of several books of poems.* Neil Leonard's *book,* Jazz and the White Americans *has just been published by the University of Chicago Press.*

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MOVIES

Early Fall Roundup

Mr. Arkadin (M. and A. Alexander)
Gigot (20th Century-Fox)
Divorce – Italian Style (Embassy)
Der Rosenkavalier (Rank)

Orson Welles made *Mr. Arkadin* abroad in 1955; it was shown there as *Confidential Report*, but it has not had theatrical distribution here until now. It does little to resolve the contradictions of his career.

The script – by Welles – is Ambler parody, unintentional. One of those mystery millionaires of Europe is amnesiac about the first 20 years of his life, and he hires an American roustabout, who is wooing his daughter, to search out his beginnings. Suspense stories of this kind are supposed to travel on rails of cynical worldliness, impelled by murder, with waystops of bizarre character. But Welles' dialogue is so ludicrously gnomic, the motivations so abrupt, the atmosphere so vacuously portentous, that the film is never either scary or moving. It was photographed all over Europe with the avidity for color of the American expatriate who wants to show the stay-at-homes how acclimated he is to Old World byways and blasé wickedness.

The post-recorded sound-track, partially dubbed by some who are not in the cast, is execrable. Playing Arkadin, Welles figuratively smells of greasepaint and spirit gum as his wig line, beard line, and putty nose shriek for attention. Robert Arden, the American, is the most dubious of Welles' several dubious discoveries. Michael Redgrave plays an eccentric Polish pawnbroker with heavy stress on all three components.

Having said that, let us note that Katina Paxinou gives her usual good performance and Akim Tamiroff his unusually good one. More importantly, every foot of the film was shot with a dramatic vigor and the whole work composed with visual ingenuity. Welles has a gigantic gift for telling stories excitingly with the camera; but here, as on other occasions, he wastes it on inferior stuff. (On two *other* occasions he distorted *Macbeth* and *Othello*.) *Mr. Arkadin* proves yet again that the creative and the editorial gift are not always present simultaneously.

It was good news that Jackie Gleason planned to play a pantomime part in a sound film because much of his TV pantomime has been sharp and funny. It is bad news in the event. *Gigot*, his own script, is the story of a mute, impoverished Parisian janitor, the butt of the neighborhood, who befriends a tart and her small daughter. There has clearly been an effort to make a chubby Chaplin of Gleason: he is ragged; he gets knocked about; animals love him; soft lights shine on him; wistful music trails him. Two faults undermine the picture: the pathos is all *around* him, made by effects and other people – he himself is never affecting; and when he is really called on to deliver – as in his mimed report of a funeral – the results are disappointingly blurred and unimaginative. The whole film is a setting for a star performance that never arrives, a forceless *tour de force*. It was produced in Paris and some of the French actors are familiar, although, under Gene Kelly's incompetent direction, they are seen at their worst.

Divorce – Italian Style is an immediately provocative title because, as the publicized plight of a certain star has made clear, there is no divorce in Italy. There is, however, a provision in the Penal Code that a husband who makes a *corpus delicti* of a wife found *in flagrante delicto* is subject to a sentence of only 3 to 7 years. In practice he often gets the minimum and, with time off for good behavior, serves about 18 months. The logic, for an unhappy husband, is inevitable.

Marcello Mastroianni plays a bored Sicilian nobleman (in itself a comic subject to mainland Italians) who is weary of his pillowy wife and is smitten with a fetching 16-year-old. Taking the penal code as his guide, he schemes to lure his wife into extra-curricular activity and then to divorce her, Italian style. Mastroianni, with hair plastered by day and tousled by night, exudes ennui and libido. Odoardo Spadaro, his father, is so austerely handsome that his maid-pinching is all the funnier. Daniele Rocca breathes piousness and passion as the wife, and young Stefania Sandrelli makes a lovely nymph for this faun's afternoon.

Much of the film, which Pietro Germi directed, is pitilessly and wittily observant: as in its picture of the male

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
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chauvinism of the town life, its hint of *mafia* braggadocio, its candor about this raffish aristocracy. (After their siesta the men sit around through the rest of the day in their pajama coats.) But the picture wavers in tone, and its inconsistency defeats it.

Cruel comedy (at which the French are so adept) has one absolute requisite: it cannot happen to characters we care about or who are made real, otherwise the fact of their killing or being killed is too vivid to be funny. If the baron simply lusted after the girl or were stupidly insipid about her, if she were a ninny or a contriver, we could laugh wholeheartedly; but (for example) their encounter while picking flowers is too touching to fit in with comic murder. And the wife is not nearly repugnant enough to be killable. Some of the developments, too, are out of key with place and character. A Sicilian wife does not desert her husband on the slight provocation in this film, and the final touch is incongruous with the patient simplicity of the girl.

For four nights only, beginning October 9, Carnegie Hall in New York will present a color film of Strauss' *Der Rosenkavalier*. The opera was photographed in its entirety on the stage of the Salzburg *Festspielhaus* and was recorded subsequently by the same cast, headed by Elizabeth Schwarzkopf, Sena Jurinac, and Otto Edelmann, under the baton of Herbert von Karajan. It purports to be nothing more than a camera-and-sound record of a fine opera-house performance. A sermon about opera on film is thus out of order; it is always clumsy, whether it is performed by actors and sung by singers or "adapted" as a film, so, if it is to be done at all, it might as well be done this way – just as a record. One can wish that the color photography were of a later vintage than c. 1940 and that the film editing were less pedestrian, but those who value Strauss' work as the high point of *Oper mit Schlag* will enjoy it. Others will not be interested.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

ART

The Private Sector and the Public Happiness

We happy few still on the left wing of American political economics are fond of pointing out to one another that the "private sector" of the economy has been over-developed at the expense of what we are about to start calling the "public happiness." It's an easy case to make, starting with the situation of the schools as compared with that of the tail-fin trust.

Every once in a while, though, something happens to give us pause and honesty requires us to acknowledge it. Such a pause that depresses is going on right now in Milwaukee. The private sector has moved dynamically and with style to fill a gap in the public happiness to which the relevant public officials have been aggressively indifferent. Last week at the small and lovely Milwaukee Art Center – Eero Saarinen's building – the S. C. Johnson and Son Wax Company unveiled a brand new collection of contemporary American painting which, starting in Vienna in January, the company is about to launch on a lengthy tour of Europe, Latin America and Asia. The collection consists of 102 works acquired at a cost of theree quarters of a million dollars and is without qualification the most comprehensive view of American painting ever made generally available to Europeans and others.

The "others" should probably include most Americans as well. The show, "Art: USA: Now," was chosen by the New York art dealer Lee Nordness, and comes light years closer to justifying its title than any of the big exhibitions periodically sent abroad by the Museum of Modern Art and/or USIA. Ever since Congressman Dondero proved that all American artists are Communists, USIA has been concentrating on peripheral exhibitions of crafts, of architecture and of painters "under thirty-five." (The latter mysterious note is explained by art handicappers as leaving out artists old enough to have been emotionally involved with the Spanish Civil War. UNESCO, playing it even safer, concentrates on painters under twelve.) The Museum of Modern Art, adhering to completely different safety standards, has concentrated on abstract expressionism in the export trade, although recently it has shown signs of a cautious break-out from those academic confines.

"Art: USA: Now" observes none of those limitations. Quality has apparently been the main guide within the overall intent to assemble a representative view of a subject usually violently misrepresented, the present scope of American painting. The academic painters are well-represented: Motherwell, Okada, Kline, Marca-Relli, Gottlieb, Yunkers, Sam Francis, De Kooning, Rauschenberg, Hartigan, Hans Hofmann and Joan Mitchell among them. This is the kind of group which many Europeans undoubtedly think comprises the whole of American painting. They're in for a revelation.

The show takes a reasonably comprehensive look at what has been called post-abstract expressionism, that is, the work of painters who have taken over some of the "language" of the movement – large size, free brushwork and arbitrary color – for the old-time purposes of human communication through images. Al Blaustein's jungle group, "The Triangle" is such a painting; so is Paul Wonner's lonely figure in a blue "Bedroom" though it probably owes as much to Edward Hopper as it does to Wonner's immediate predecessors, Richard Diebenkorn and Elmer Bischoff, both of whom, like Hopper, are in the show.

Similarly the 102 include representative works by painters who, while never really part of the academy, were

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nevertheless tolerated to the point of being invited to academic exhibitions and noticed in academic publications: Larry Rivers, for example, Tobey and Graves, and Ad Reinhardt.

But where "Art: USA: Now" really breaks new ground in American art abroad is its enthusiastic recognition of the continuing existence of American painters totally unrelated to the academy. "Art: USA: Now" is a massive blow for freedom in American art.

What the freedom reveals is heartening. In the first place it reveals a large number of American painters vitally interested in a large number of things beyond their own visceral reactions to viscous paint or their own monumental reactions to monumental masonite. It brings together the dazzling analysis of light and shadow by Charles Sheeler and the geometrical construction of Ralston Crawford, the latter, by the way, remarkably to the point of Saarinen's building. It joins the political tragedy of one of Ben Shahn's Lucky Dragon pictures, "We Did Not Know What Had Happened to Us," with the gold and silver intimacy of an Isabel Bishop "Nude," in which the undressing figure links the tired city office girl, through the tone and the surface movement, with Danae and the shower of gold. It poses the sardonic, beautifully painted comment of Jack Levine's "Art Lover" against the fading nostalgia of Walter Stuempfig's "Vision of an Island."

For decades the true merit of American painting has been its wide variety, a variety which, intentionally or unintentionally, has been effectively suppressed in most important surveys for about fifteen years. The "now" in "Art: USA: Now" means, among other things, that at long last the masquerade is over. Europe and the world will have the chance to see just about everything that is going on in our art.

Inasmuch as this tremendously important exhibition has been assembled and is being presented by the private sector, it affords an opportunity to reassess our attitudes about that sector and its relations to culture. Andrew Carnegie's rather chilling Gospel of Wealth has certainly been given a new lease on life. Most governments are actively concerned about the arts. Ours isn't and it doesn't seem very likely to become so – the First Lady and William Walton notwithstanding. The measure of our official indifference-hostility is seen in our national veneration of Mrs. Kennedy's attendance at the first half of a symphony program and of her successful antique collecting.

Meanwhile, back at the waxworks, the wealthy corporation is doing for the government what the government is too penurious to do for itself.

Frank Getlein

Correspondence

On Dealing Franco Out

Sirs:

May I congratulate Mr. Louis J. Halle on his brilliant sophistry ("Dealing with Franco," September 24). His collection of red herrings is enviable. Thus he battles against "the tacit assumption that by overthrowing bad government one gets good government," an assumption nowhere to be found in my article or in any of my works. I am a pessi-optimist, *i.e.* I think that considering how bad human beings are, it is wonderful how well they behave under free governments. I don't put it any higher than that. Furthermore, since the American government is free and I am strongly criticizing it for its bad behavior in Spain, I find it hard to understand why Mr. Halle thought it necessary to bring into the discussion that particular red herring.

He repeatedly asserts that the people of Spain accept the regime since they submit to its authority. He overlooks the fact that no political authority is tolerated in Spain under the effective pressure of the army and the police. His assertion that "Washington cannot conduct tests in the jurisdiction of other governments to determine whether their decisions have the 'support' of the people" is preposterous. The Spanish government acknowledge their lack of popular support by refusing freedom to the press, holding no elections, jailing and barbarously treating any person who emits an opinion or tries to organize a political party and in every way preventing the people from expressing their opposition. When the men who attended the European con-

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gress in Munich are still in jail or in exile for so doing, it is beyond comprehension for me to read under the signature of an American citizen that the Spaniards accept the regime and that the American government cannot know what is going on in this respect since it can conduct no tests.

Mr. Halle writes: "It is not the business of the US to select the government of the Spanish people"; and argues that "we could not effectively deal with the matters involved in our myriad necessary relations with Spain while following a policy of publicly insulting her officials." I must protest against these misrepresentations of my article. No one is asking that the United States select a liberal democratic government for Spain. All we ask is that the USA not prevent us from doing it by backing the present regime every time it gets into hot water as it has done since 1953; and nobody asks that that the United States insult Spanish officials; all we ask is that it not decorate them with the Order of Merit.

This so-called answer to my article leaves unanswered my chief points. By its behavior toward the Spanish people, the US has compromised its good name and has delayed the liberation of Spain. The nonintervention argument does not apply; if only because the United States keeps intervening in Spain, in favor of Franco and against liberal democracy.

Salvador de Madriaga
Oxford, England

One encounters rather often these days an attitude which has been called the "new realism." It is both cultured and pragmatic, patient and optimistic, wide-ranging and precise. It tends to express an elegant "long view." It likes to dispel illusions about the extent to which the US can truly sway the course of world events. It eschews the moralistic double-talk of our elders. But this is not all. That the new realism conceals treasures of flexibility, is what Halle's recent reply to Salvador de Madariaga, "On Dealing with Franco" (*NR*, September 24), demonstrates so well.

Mr. Halle closes his article with the following statement, on which his case rests: "To conclude – it is not the business of the United States to select the government of the Spanish people; and it is not its business to reject the government that they themselves accept, however unhappily."

The first half of that conclusion centers on the verb "select," an ironic exaggeration of what was termed earlier in his article "the principle of non-intervention." It is not only unfortunate to recall a principle to which General Franco owed so much during the Spanish Civil War, but incorrect to apply it to the present. For the origin of Mr. Madariaga's complaint is precisely the decisive intervention of the United States in Spanish affairs through its military and political partnership with Franco since 1953. Franco's American dollars, guns and jet planes intervene in Spain every day of the year, just as the US Air Force and Navy do. It may not be the business of the United States, in Mr. Halle's words, to select the future government of Spain; but the United States has surely made it its business to support and arm a dictatorship which prevents the Spanish people from selecting its own government.

A future Spanish democratic regime will most probably desire to join the Western bloc of nations. For the time being, however, anti-Franco Spaniards would settle, very precisely, for US non-intervention – the most urgent condition for dealing Franco out. In practical terms, this would signify the refusal to renew in 1963 the lease of American bases in Spain except under certain political conditions – similar to those that are required under the Alliance for Progress in Latin America.

Speaking of Latin America, Mr. Halle hits upon a curious dilemma: "one is the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of weaker states; the other is the principle of refusing to accept the existence of dictatorships." It

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is not difficult to remember, however, the simple fashion in which this conflict has been solved in the past. Mr. Halle's exercise in abstraction comes to an end as soon as we think of Somoza, Trujillo, Batista, Pérez Jiménez and numerous other Latin American dictators with whom the United States has maintained expedient or temporary alliances. It took the shock of Marxism in the Caribbean to alter this state of affairs, though apparently not in the Western Mediterranean.

The second half of Mr. Halle's statement turns on the verb "accept." One gathers from the context that Mr. Halle does not mean that Spaniards admire Franco, but simply that they fail to revolt against him. There is of course much truth in the factual observation (there is peace in Spain), but the political conclusion (that this justifies our support of Franco) is very startling. Should the US arm Franco to the teeth because the Spanish people fail to face the fire of his old German weapons?

Mr. Halle, actually, was answering Salvador de Madariaga's reference to the history of our relations with Cuba. "This would have more point, it seems to me" – writes Mr. Halle – "if a large portion of the Spanish people were in active rebellion against Franco as the Cuban people were in active rebellion against Batista."

This comparison neglects to consider that: 1) Castro was not brought in by a general uprising of the Cuban people; a handful of men started what later became a middle-class, not a peasant, revolution; 2) a large chronological gap allows us to compare post-Batista Cuba with Franco Spain, though it would be more correct to recall the times when there was no rebellion in Cuba and the US confidently supported Batista; 3) "a large portion of the Spanish people" fought in or experienced the 1936-39 Civil War.

It is indispensable and crucial that non-Spaniards should understand this last point, which distinguishes radically the Franco regime from the governments of Batista, Salazar, Tito, Kadar and other Fascist or Communist dictatorships. General Franco is above all the victor of an intensely-fought, nationwide civil conflict which, for three years, not only threw brother against brother on the battlefield and caused a million deaths, but also brought blood and revenge, dismay and the hate of politics, to every Spanish town and village. These horrors are etched profoundly in the conscience of every Spaniard over, more or less, 40 years of age – that is, of those who have the political initiative today. It must be remembered that Spain has existed in a state of chronic civil war since the Napoleonic invasion of 1808. The fact that most responsible Spaniards today wish above all to avoid another armed conflict and to bypass violence, at the risk of enduring Franco some time longer and of proving Mr. Halle right, must be felt by every sensitive observer, to be a great step forward and a hopeful omen for the future. This accounts, in part, for the docile behavior of the Spanish middle-class (which contrasts with the unrest among workers, intellectuals and students).

Mr. Halle writes most sensibly when he points out the limits of US responsibility for political conditions around the world, and the necessity of establishing courteous relations with governments one does not respect. The Franco regime is indeed the Spaniards' responsibility – not the Pentagon's. The avenues of influence, however, carry two-way traffic. A nation that sends troops to Lebanon and Thailand, patrols the waters of Formosa and Santo Domingo, mounts an invasion of Cuba, and sprinkles Europe with military bases, cannot expect the weaker states to make a conservative estimate of her power. Courtesy and non-support are not incompatible. Relations could have been maintained with Spain without arranging visits to Madrid by John Foster Dulles, President Eisenhower, Dean Rusk and Adlai Stevenson.

Claudio Guillén
Princeton University

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

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

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

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

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

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

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